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Health, Hygiene and Sanitation in Latin America 
C.1870-C.1950 
This Research Paper sets out to examine transitions within health care in 
Latin America between c. 1870 and c. 1950 and offers a preliminary synthesis. 
Whereas a powerful historiography has evolved over the past thirty years that 
strives to synthesise diffuse materials on the insertion of Latin America into 
the world economy and subsequent 'de-linkage', there are few attempts to 
summarise the historiography of social policy. Given the embryonic nature 
of the subject, the author is trying to avoid premature generalisation and 
excessive claims, and is fully conscious that more questions are raised than 
are resolved by this paper. A broad chronological canvas is adopted, which 
is useful in clarifying diversity within the continent, but can also obscure 
issues of periodisation. 
The first section enquires into the relationship between the genesis of a 
modern public health policy and the experience of tackling epidemic and 
endemic diseases, and reviews the motives behind ameliorative health 
measures undertaken by the state and business, especially foreign enterprise, 
and their significance. The second section investigates the interaction 
between external forces and domestic changes: both the role of an interna-
tional voluntary agency in tackling prostitution and, by implication, venereal 
diseases; and the significance of missions from developed countries that 
aimed to raise an alertness to modern methodology and investigation in 
'tropical medicine', to institutionalise public health laboratories, and to 
undertake 'campaigns' against targeted diseases. This section concludes with 
an analysis of a specific example of externally inspired innovation in hygiene 
and sanitation: the Panama Canal. There follows a section that uses the 
special case of Rio de Janeiro to elucidate problems of evolving a public 
health policy for cities; and from that vantage point looks at the beginnings 
of public health policy in the Brazilian countryside. The penultimate section 
looks at the diffusion of scientific knowledge, the limits to its impact and the 
resilience of Luso-Hispanic, Amerindian and Afro-Latin American traditions 
of healing and curing. The final section consists of notes on the nature of the 
relationship between levels of health and of nutrition and housing. 
The optimism associated with the liberal ascendancy and pragmatic 
policies of export-led growth between c.1870 and the World Depression of 
1929-33 gave rise to optimism regarding issues of health care, hygiene and 
sanitation. Civilian elites were confident that it was only a matter of time 
before the health care performance and life expectancy rates of Latin 
America caught up with those of Western Europe and the United States, as 
a result of the diffusion of European and US organisational models in public 
health and medical education and practice, investment in research (especially 
into 'tropical' medicine) and the application of its findings, together with the 
adoption of an advanced medical technology.1 'Europeanising' elites, 
consciously part of a vanguard that embraced republicanism, liberal 
economic ideology and symbols of modernity such as constitutions and 
rational legal codes, placed the professionalisation of medicine and public 
health policy firmly on their agendas for the first time. Solid grounds for 
optimism existed. Levels of health care and nutrition seemed to be rising as 
Latin America enjoyed the positive consequences of a combination of an 
influx of foreign capital, technology and European and Asian immigrants. 
Dietary preferences broadened; and the growth of cities and the construction 
of railways gave an impetus to commercial agriculture for domestic 
consumption. The markets acknowledged that Latin America enjoyed an 
abundance of resources, that ranged from cinchona bark, from which the 
invaluable prophylactic quinine was derived, to an unequalled variety of 
health-giving fruits, both temperate and tropical, with commercial potential. 
By European standards the region was remarkably free of the high death rates 
and broader disruption caused by major international warfare.2 Latin 
American countries shared at little cost a distilled Euro-US experience of 
war-related improvements in health provision, such as the evolution of an 
army medical corps, and the treatment of gunshot wounds, fractures and 
traumas. Even in domestic upheavals, like the last of the Colombian civil 
wars - the War of the Thousand Days (1899-1902), European organisational 
models were adopted: a Red Cross ambulance attended the wounded during 
two major battles in 1901. 
The half-century after independence had been disappointing. The 
promising, if haphazard, initiatives to improve medical education and to 
counter epidemic disease during the decades before the Spanish American and 
Haitian revolutions for independence were seldom sustained; and various 
attempts to revive 'progressive' policies in the embryonic republics were 
1 For the European context, see W.F. Bynum, Science and the Practice 
of Medicine in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1994), which contains an 
invaluable bibliographical essay. 
2 The main exceptions were the damage inflicted on Cuba during the 
Second Cuban War of Independence (1895-8) and upon Paraguay and Bolivia 
by the Chaco War (1932-6). 
aborted by poverty and civil war.3 In Brazil a greater degree of political 
continuity permitted a series of modest social policy achievements that set a 
pattern of gradualism. But elsewhere the record was disappointing. It was 
only with the insertion of Latin America into the world economy after 1870 
and concomitant processes of immigration, population growth and 
urbanisation, that public health acquired a particular salience. The main 
thrust of policy was to improve public hygiene and sanitation, especially in 
the cities. The beginnings of modern health policy were often simultaneous 
with the genesis of modern policing and detection methods, each being seen 
as means by which society would be sanitised in the name of progress.4 
Viewing public health provision as a form of policing that involved inspection 
and enforcement, civilian elites instigated the appointment of 'medical' and 
'sanitary' police. While acknowledging public hygiene and sanitation policy 
3 Thus, in Buenos Aires, the Protomedicato went into decline and the 
Junta de Sanidad was reduced to a board supervising port sanitation. The 
approval and re-validation of medical titles, the control of apothecaries, 
forensic investigations and port cleansing were all subject to political 
upheaval, fiscal crisis and shifting levels of concern among responsible 
bodies and individuals. One major consequence of warfare was the beginning 
of a hierarchy of military medical officers. Equipos de investigation 
historica, Buenos Aires 1800-1830, tomo 2 Salud y Delito (Buenos Aires, 
1977), esp. pp. 11, 20. Before the wars the impact of public health edicts, 
sometimes admirable in intention, that the Mexican viceregal authorities 
introduced, was nullified by incompetence among municipal authorities. 
Donald B. Cooper, Epidemic Disease in Mexico City, 1761-1813, An 
Administrative, Social and Medical History (Austin, Tx., 1965), esp. p. 188. 
See also John Tate Lanning (ed. John Jay LePaske), The Royal Proto-
medicato: the regulation of the medical profession in the Spanish empire 
(Durham, NC, 1985); David Goodman, 'The Scientific Revolution in Spain 
and Portugal', in Roy Porter and Mikas Teich (eds.), The Scientific 
Revolution in National Context (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 158-87. A smallpox 
epidemic had played a part in the crisis preceding the famous Comunero 
rebellion in El Socorro, New Granada, in 1781. Anthony McFarlane, 
Colombia before Independence. Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon 
Rule (Cambridge, 1993), p. 252. Little of French investment in medical 
infrastructure, personnel and publication in Saint Domingue survived the 
Revolution. James E. McLellan III, 'Science, Medicine and French 
Colonialism in Old Regime Haiti', in Teresa Meade and Mark Waller (eds.), 
Science, Medicine and Cultural Imperialism (London, 1991), pp. 38-59. 
4 Lyman L. Johnson, The Problem of Order in Changing Societies. Essays 
on Crime and Policing in Argentina and Uruguay, 1750-1940 (Albuquerque, 
NM, 1990), p. xiv. 
as one of its tutelary functions, the state delegated to philanthropic agencies, 
pre-eminently the Roman Catholic Church, a dominant role in nursing and 
hospital care, where it had been influential since the sixteenth century.5 
Between 1870 and the onset of the World Depression exposure to foreign 
models, more training of Latin American physicians in Western Europe and 
the United States, the impact of the early foreign missions (e.g. Pasteur, 
Rockefeller), and of international institutions like the League of Nations, 
combined with domestic pressures (an enlarged middle class, articulate 
elements in the labour movement, leaders of the military and business, and 
emergent strata of health professionals) to have a powerful and enduring 
impact. By the 1920s broader notions of public health policy began to 
supplant concepts of sanitation and hygiene in the richer Latin American 
countries. By the 1940s these ideas had penetrated central government 
agencies throughout the continent, so that in the mid-twentieth century most 
countries possessed at least the rudiments of a modern public health and 
social security system, although their substance was defective and the 
distribution of their benefits markedly uneven. 
The economic crises of the World Depression and the Second World War 
challenged assumptions of a linear progress in health care as in other areas 
of the political economy. Various questions, which cannot be fully explored 
here, arise. How far did the World Depression constitute a watershed in 
social policy, and how far a point of clarification and reappraisal? How far 
did the hardship and suffering of the early 1930s give greater urgency to 
reform schemes mooted in the 1920s? To what extent did the Depression 
usher in a period of new social policies better adjusted to local conditions 
than earlier ones that emulated European models? The 1930s and 1940s were 
decades of experiments in social policy - some of them bold, pragmatic and 
altruistic - that ranged from the establishment of baby clinics and specialist 
cancer and cardiology services to modest urban public housing projects and 
early investigations of patterns of nutrition and the cost of living. Populist, 
5 This was steadily eroded by an expansion of public hospital provision 
and the foundation of secular nursing schools between the 1910s and 1950s 
By the early 1940s the Catholic Church was unable to meet growing demand 
for hospital care and had done little to modernise nursing education, leaving 
space which the secular authorities and even Protestant missionaries sought 
to fill. Catholic conservatives complained of imperialist penetration by 
Presbyterians who built the American Hospital in Guatemala City. While 
expressing some sympathy for Protestant campaigns against alcoholism, 
prominent Catholics feared that these could undermine their networks of 
support and disrupt communal bonds, when they targeted cofradias. Nathan 
L. Whetten, Guatemala - the land and the people (New Haven, 1968), p. 
308. 
radical, liberal and some authoritarian conservative regimes conceived of 
health care projects as privileges useful in co-opting sections of organised 
labour and various occupational groups - the military, bureaucrats, 
schoolteachers - into the political order. 
At the same time the notion asserted in the Mexican Constitution of 1917 
that health care was an entitlement took root. Resistance came from some 
right-wing minorities, which perceived any moves beyond charitable 
provision as suspect and even 'populist'.6 External forces, many of them 
emanating from the United States, reasserted themselves. In the 1930s and 
1940s postgraduate training of physicians, public health specialists and then 
nurses in the United States and 'missions' by the Rockefeller Foundation to 
Latin America had by the 1940s a significant resonance, which was 
complemented by the power of international institutions, both permanent and 
ephemeral, like the Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO, the 
International Labour Office (ILO) and the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau 
(PASB). Did international forces, both official and philanthropic, have the 
positive impact that they claimed? Or did they divert incipient health 
ministries from defining their own health care priorities to an agenda set from 
outside that distorted policy-making and budget allocations? The end of the 
Second World War was associated with a cautious optimism about the 
prospects of economic recovery for incomes and nutrition and a euphoria 
among health professionals about the discovery of penicillin. However, this 
optimism was qualified across Latin America by a greater alertness than 
before to disparities within the continent, notably the chasm between the 
'European' levels of income and welfare pertaining in the cities of Buenos 
Aires and Montevideo and the 'sub-Saharan African' conditions prevalent in 
Haiti, and the gap between the dynamic manufacturing and coffee-exporting 
Centre-South of Brazil and the impoverished subsistence and semi-subsis-
tence farming areas of the Nordeste. Issues of inequality by region, social 
class, ethnic group, age cohort, gender and the urban-rural divide, that had 
been incompletely appreciated before 1929 and had often been submerged 
amidst more generalised crisis between 1929 and 1945, became pressing in 
the health care sector, before Latin America was overtaken by the 'demo-
graphic explosion'. As the range of health issues was investigated by PAHO 
and other institutions, so their character changed, because another hasty 
transition occurred, from a continent with an overwhelmingly rural 
population in the 1930s to a predominantly urban population profile in the 
6 One example was somocista Nicaragua where in the early 1950s the 
World Bank warned that farm mechanisation and improved transport would 
bring about little increase in production without improvements in basic health 
and housing. IBRD (World Bank), Economic Development of Nicaragua 
(Baltimore, 1953), pp. 22-8. 
1970s. New, more accurate tools of policy diagnosis were assembled, but 
precise prognosis and appropriate prescription became an increasingly 
hazardous task. New specialist institutions handling problems like cancer 
existed in several countries: but a transition in the function of the public 
hospital, still the health institution par excellence, from a 'waiting-room 
before death' to a place of therapeutic efficiency was far from complete. 
Disease and public policy 
For liberal, positivist and, in Mexico, nominally revolutionary governments, 
public health policy became an instrument for expanding the authority of the 
state, reconciling the growing middle class and elements of organised labour 
to notions of gradual and controlled change, and enlarging a technically 
proficient state apparatus in the face of persistent caciquismo and coronel-
ismo. As nuclei of acknowledged expertise were formed in national capitals, 
the authority of the central state in health issues expanded at the expense of 
regional and local government. A new bureaucratic interest that demanded 
a degree of autonomy in the taking and execution of decisions was a force 
with which incoming governments had to reckon. Public policy in sanitation 
and hygiene played an essential part in strategies of export-led growth. 
Modernising elites looked to campaigns to 'eradicate' (or, more accurately, 
to 'control') specific diseases as vital means of enlarging the labour supply 
and alluring European immigrants. Some governments applied similar 
campaigns along the national frontiers in order to consolidate national 
markets and to enlist the loyalty of frontier populations to the central state. 
Similar measures were taken in economically strategic areas of the tropical 
lowlands, such as oil-producing zones, in order to foster labour migrations 
from the highlands. By the 1890s policy was motivated in the Southern Cone 
and Brazil in large measure by a determination to lure European immigrants 
and to keep them.7 Early batllista social policy in Uruguay - in health as in 
pensions and employment conditions - was predicated on the need to attract 
immigrants and integrate them, and not to lose them to Buenos Aires or from 
there to Australia or South Africa.8 Commercial interests in Brazil, anxious 
that foreign ships would alter their schedules to stop only at Uruguay and 
Argentina, welcomed the imposition of sanitary reforms in Brazilian 
7 Colin M. Lewis, 'Economic Restructuring and Labour Scarcity: 
Argentina in the 1920s', in Jeremy Adelman (ed.), Essays in Argentine 
Labour History 1870-1930 (London, 1992), p. 193. 
8 M.H.J. Finch, A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (London, 
1981), pp. 24, 40, 47. 
seaports. Argentine business interests were alarmed when epidemics of 
smallpox and typhus, economic depression and a violent uprising by the 
Union Civica Radical (UCR) combined in 1890 to cause a net loss of 
immigrants for the first time in the history of the city of Buenos Aires.9 By 
the 1890s governments in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay recognised that 
extemporised responses to recurrent crises did not suffice, that preventive 
action was more effective and often less costly than curative, and that a corps 
of permanent expertise was needed to formulate policy on hygiene and 
sanitation and to handle problems of endemic and epidemic disease. By the 
1920s most other governments in Latin America shared these views. 
Externally, hygiene and sanitation measures were useful in projecting an 
image of modernity and salubriousness to woo foreign investors and 
merchants, and, from the 1900s in the Caribbean, tourists. Domestically, the 
same measures were valuable to project a semblance of ordered benevolence, 
and also to instil social discipline among resident and migrant populations. 
To military and ecclesiastical uniforms was added the uniform of the white 
coat. It was no coincidence that in Latin America as in Europe religious and 
military metaphor was endlessly repeated, with references to hygiene 
'campaigns', sanitary 'brigades' and 'crusades', and health 'missions'. 
The impetus to a modern public health policy came from diverse quarters. 
One was war. Soldiers returning from the Paraguayan War (1864-70) brought 
cholera to Buenos Aires, precipitating the imposition of quarantine measures; 
nevertheless, 1,500 died. The Peruvian government equated preventive action 
with patriotic zeal: afraid of outbreaks of smallpox during the War of the 
Pacific (1879-83) against Chile, the Peruvian authorities gave a prize each 
year to a physician who excelled in propagating the merits of regular 
revaccination.10 In Colombia the Leticia War against Peru gave an impetus 
to the reform of the health apparatus of the military in the mid-1930s.11 In 
Mexico in 1921 civil war, especially the religious confrontations in Jalisco 
and Colima that preceded the Cristero revolt, increased the number of 
yellow-fever cases in 1921, which 'Rockefeller doctors' then tackled. War 
9 Julia Kirk Blackweller, 'Urbanization, Crime and Policing: Buenos 
Aires, 1880-1914', in Johnson (ed.), The Problem of Order..., pp. 79-82. 
10 Juan B. Lastres, La salud publica y la prevention de la viruela en el 
Peru (Lima, 1957), p. 208. The medico-higienista Jose Casimiro Ulloa, who 
reorganised the medical services during the war against Chile is recalled as 
a national hero. Ibid., pp. 210-6. 
11 Christopher Abel, Health Care in Colombia C.1920-C.1950. A 
Preliminary Analysis, Institute of Latin American Studies, Research Papers 
36 (London, 1994), passim. 
and revolution probably enhanced the reputation of the medical profession, 
enabling it to play a major part in the task of post-revolutionary pacifica-
tion.12 The medical profession and new medical technology were lauded, 
and indeed, in the paintings of the leading revolutionary artist Diego Rivera, 
celebrated (e.g. Vaccination, 1932). 
The outstanding example of health changes induced by warfare was Cuba. 
During the Second Cuban War of Independence (1895-8) disease spread 
unchecked in occupied towns where troops were billeted, and again as 
conscripts and rebels returned to their homes. The concentraciones of rural 
populations in urban centres, part of the unsuccessful strategy of General 
Valenciano Weyler to defeat the rebels, exacerbated problems of hunger and 
dietary deficiencies, and reinforced Cuba's overseas reputation for high 
mortality and morbidity rates. Rampant famine and pestilence caused the 
death rate to soar from about 30 per 1,000 in 1895 to 72 per 1,000 in 
1899.13 The first US occupation government applied draconian public health 
measures in order to make the island 'safe' for metropolitan investment and 
to encourage peninsular immigrants. Strict regulations for burial and the 
quarantine of international travellers were applied; establishments selling and 
preparing food were inspected and regulated; and the Yellow Fever 
Commission ordered the draining of swamps, the 'petrolisation' of stagnant 
ponds and puddles, and the use of insecticide. In 1902 not one new case of 
yellow fever was reported. Since the mosquito carrying malaria was often the 
same as that carrying yellow fever, the number of new victims of malaria fell 
too.14 Early twentieth century public health policy was so successful that 
mortality rates compared favourably to Southern Europe by the 1910s, and 
Cubanophils in Spain praised the good health record of the Cuban Repub-
lic.15 
12 Solorzano Ramos, 'The Rockefeller Foundation...', passim. 
13 Nicolas Sanchez-Albornoz, The Population of Latin America. A History 
(trans. W. Richardson)(Berkeley, Cal., 1974), pp. 166, 173. 
14 Jorge Diaz Briquets, The Health Revolution in Cuba (Austin, Tx., 
1983), esp. pp. 13, 32, 321; Nancy Leys Stepan, 'The interplay between 
socio-economic factors and medical science: Yellow Fever Research', Social 
Studies of Science, vol. 8, 1978, pp. 379-424. 
15 Jorge Le-Roy y Cassa, Inmigracion anti-sanitaria (Havana, 1927); 
Fernando Ortiz, Hampa afro-cubana. Los negros brujos (Havana, 1979), p. 
15. Contrast Peru, where in spite of the work done by itinerant vaccinators 
authorised to work outside Lima from 1847, a noisy polemic about the 
relative merits of vaccines imported from Argentina and Britain, the 
In peacetime ideology and the interests of governing elites converged upon 
the formulation of effective public health policy. Aiming to evolve social 
policies that facilitated an expansion of the market economy, self-consciously 
'enlightened' elites that identified with Western Europe and then the United 
States played a major part in promoting policies of public health and 
sanitation. Mexico exemplified the ways in which positivist thinking came 
first to infuse medical education and then to have a broader impact. Anxious 
to implant the most 'modern' ideas - scientific and educational as well as 
political and economic, national elites warmly embraced infusions of science. 
The first prominent positivist in Mexico, Pedro Contreras Elizalde, who had 
associated with Comte's disciples in Paris, held chairs in medicine in Mexico 
City and Guanajuato as early as the late 1850s and 1860s. Just as positivists 
prescribed a 'scientific politics' that released the state and the citizen from 
theology and superstition, so too they argued for the emancipation of all 
branches of education from the tutelage of the church. During the late 1870s 
Mexican medical students debated the aims and content of the curriculum, the 
relative merits of education and instruction, and the relationship of higher 
education and the state. A group of graduates, mainly physicians, from the 
prestigious Escuela Preparatoria formed the Asociacion Metodofila Gabriel 
Barreda, which discussed Darwin's biological theories, sought to apply the 
rigorous logic of scientific method to all kinds of phenomena, and shaped an 
intellectual environment responsive to Social Darwinism.16 
Mexican positivists, who debated whether Mexico was yet ready for a 
'scientific priesthood' (or Comtean meritocracy), and who adapted Spencer-
ian maxims to national circumstances, puzzled whether the 'redemption' of 
the Amerindian should be left to natural evolutionary forces, and considered 
in detail such questions as whether the dental structure of the Amerindian 
indicated an advanced evolution.17 However, as Thomas F. Glick stresses, 
transformation of an Establo Vacinal into the Instituto de Vacuna in 1896, 
and collaboration from the ministers responsible for the army, navy, police 
and education in the task of vaccinating public employees, a smallpox 
epidemic raged in 1914. Lastres, La saludpublica..., esp. pp. 220-5. 
16 It also helped place obligatory primary education on the statute book in 
1888. 
17 Charles A. Hale, The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth 
Century Mexico (Princeton, N.J., 1989). 
positivism in Latin America preceded the experimental sciences.18 Injections 
of scientific method and a smattering of scientific knowledge among rarefied 
minorities gave rise to polemics about 'scientific polities', 'scientific racism' 
and, later, 'scientific philanthropy'. These were circumstances in which 
medical professionals, dazzled by scientific and material progress, formed 
incipient public health 'movements' with allies in business, government and 
the professions, who were anxious to create 'civilised cities'. While medical 
elites gave public endorsement to new drugs peddled by German, French, 
British and US pharmaceutical enterprises, medical academies performed a 
didactic and consultative role, and endeavoured to establish an informed 
public opinion on public health issues, and published specialist periodicals for 
professionals.19 Yet poverty and underdevelopment precluded the formation 
of more than a rudimentary research environment in the sciences, just as they 
limited the nationwide implementation of costly public health measures. 
In several countries, most significantly Argentina and Mexico, socialists 
and radicals went further than positivists in pressing for change. Emulating 
their European counterparts Socialist intellectuals in Argentina called for 
changes in medical studies, in particular, in the 1920s stressing the need to 
study the environment of the patient and not only his/her medical condition. 
Socialists in charge of the Industrial Hygiene Section of the National 
Department of Hygiene and the Criminology Institute pressed for a greater 
awareness of social medicine and occupational diseases.20 In the 1930s 
Mexican radicals went further. A Six-Year Plan of Health Organisation 
undertaken in 1935 budgeted for an extension of the public water supply in 
rural areas, and for health education manuals, pamphlets and recorded 
18 Thomas F. Glick, 'Science and society in twentieth century Latin 
America', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America. 
Volume VI: Latin America since 1930. Economy, Society and Politics. Part 
I. Economy and Society (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 463-524. 
19 Luis Antonio de Castro-Santos, 'Power, ideology and public health in 
Brazil, 1889-1930', (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard Univ., 1987) esp. pp. 39-
40. 
20 Positivists and socialists alike praised the merits of preventive action 
against venereal diseases and tuberculosis, as well as extolling the benefits 
of sports and cycling. Edward A. Zimmermann, 'Intellectuals, Universities 
and the Social Question in Argentina, 1898-1916', in Jeremy Adelman (ed.), 
Essays in Argentine Labour History, 1870-1930 (London, 1992), pp. 199-
216. 
messages heard on phonographs in both Spanish and Maya.21 From 1936 
Mexican radicals debated vigorously whether rural physicians should be 
given a special training that was consonant with the agrarian aims of the 
Revolution. At UNAM (the National Autonomous University of Mexico) a 
five-month compulsory experience of working in a rural community before 
graduation was launched. The National Polytechnical Institute went further, 
introducing a full five-and-a-half-year teaching programme adapted to rural 
conditions, that included some study of social anthropology, and that 
produced its first graduates in 1947. This initiative was attacked for 
ideological reasons, because the promotion of 'socialised medicine' and even 
of communal responsibility ran contrary to ingrained individualistic traditions 
within the medical profession. Practical difficulties arose too, regarding 
admissions, training and the duplication of facilities.22 
Official initiative was accompanied and sometimes preceded by business 
initiative. Some international enterprises came to recognise the benefits of 
company expenditure on rudimentary health care and a clean water supply, 
together with some cheap but sanitary housing provision, as means of 
assuring a continuous supply of skilled labour and of forestalling state 
interference. The British-owned Antofagasta (Chili) and Bolivia Railway 
Company provided medical services with a British doctor and nurses for 
British employees, and expanded its services with Chilean doctors to cover 
Chilean and Bolivian employees in the face of outbreaks of bubonic plague, 
malaria and typhoid, as well as problems of alcoholism and rail accidents. 
The company contributed funds, that complemented financing from the 
Chilean government, for the construction of a hospital by the Junta de 
Beneficencia (Charity Board) of the town of Antofagasta.23 The US con-
glomerate, the United Fruit Company (UFC), which was the seventh largest 
latifundista in Cuba before the Revolution of 1959, established a clean water 
supply and hospital services with workers' housing - action consistent with 
the reformist legislation of the abortive revolution of 1933-4; but the UFC 
21 Anne-Emanuelle Birn, 'Local health and Foreign Wealth: the Rocke-
feller Foundation's Public Health Programs in Mexico, 1924-1951' (unpub. 
Ph.D . thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1993), esp. p. 259. Mexican public 
health priorities were persuasively outlined as early as 1916 by Alberto Pani 
(trans. Ernesto L. de Gogorza, Hygiene in Mexico: A study of Sanitary and 
Educational problems (London, 1917). 
22 Nathan Whetten (with foreword by Manuel Gamio), Rural Mexico 
(Chicago, 1948), esp. p. 347. 
23 Harold Blakemore, From the Pacific to La Paz. The Antofagasta (Chili) 
and Bolivia Railway Company 1888-1988 (London, 1990), esp. pp. 69, 72. 
resisted political pressure for moving beyond low-cost to high-cost welfare 
provision.24 By the 1950s the two hospitals owned by United Fruit were 
among the best in Guatemala; other large plantations did not provide for their 
employees more than a periodic visit from a doctor in a nearby town.25 In 
the Colombian banana zone such devices of labour management as hospital 
provision for workers failed in the late 1920s to prevent protests or to 
mitigate resentment at an alliance between the company and the military.26 
Some national enterprises and immigrant groups took similar initiatives. 
The powerful Aspillaga family in Cayalti, Peru, evolved an embryonic 
managerial philosophy, which included an acknowledgement of the advan-
tages of extending some free medical services to reduce labour costs. 
Experiments in health attention to Chinese contract labour were extended to 
other groups.27 Meanwhile, European immigrant entrepreneurs and pro-
fessionals, like the German Welfare Association in Buenos Aires and 
voluntary groups of Asturians, Catalans and migrants from other Spanish 
regions, opened clinics and organised some medical assistance for contri-
butors to voluntary schemes. Health, hygiene and sanitation conditions played 
a crucial part in the early labour movements. In Buenos Aires in 1870 one 
prerequisite of membership of the printing craftsmen's Sociedad Tipografica 
Bonaerense, founded in 1859, was a medical examination to assess the health 
of the applicant and to determine the absence of chronic disease. From the 
1860s funds to help members in the event of illness or death were avail-
able.28 However, only with incipient industrialisation did questions of 
environmental and occupational health contribute to a growth in urban labour 
militancy. Meat-packing factories in Buenos Aires exposed workers to 
numerous hazards - alternations between extreme temperatures (chilling 
24 Various authors, United Fruit Company: un caso del dominio imperial-
ista en Cuba (Havana, 1976), pp. 88, 177. 
25 Lowry Nelson, Guatemala, the Land and the People (New Haven, 
1961), p. 232. 
26 Judy White, 'The United Fruit Company in the Santa Marta Banana 
Zone, Colombia: Conflicts in the '20s' (unpub. B. Phil, thesis, Oxford 
University, 1971). 
27 Michael J. Gonzalez, Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in 
Northern Peru, 1875-1973 (Austin, Tx., 1985), pp. 154-9. 
28 Silvia Badoza, 'Typographical Workers and their Mutualist Experience: 
the Case of the Sociedad Tipografica Bonaerense, 1857-80', in Adelman 
(ed.), Essays in Argentine Labour History..., pp. 72-90. 
rooms and boiling sectors), humidity, the use of chemicals that caused welts 
and sores, the handling of diseased animals, and wet, bloody, greasy floors. 
Work accidents and amputations occurred because of the use of cutting 
instruments; and acid fumes caused respiratory diseases. Though not 
diagnosed as such in the early twentieth century, it seems likely that 
brucellosis was commonplace.29 
The impact of public health policy was uneven by region and sector. The 
expansion of ameliorative measures seldom equalled the expansion of health 
problems, especially those arising from market growth, the sudden exposure 
of remote populations to diseases to which they had no immunity, and the 
migrations of workers between epidemiological zones. In the late nineteenth 
century Liberal governments maintained the practices of the Jesuit missions 
of concentrating once dispersed Amerindian populations into central 
settlements, which exposed them to unfamiliar diseases. In Mozos in the 
Upper Amazon region of Bolivia, epidemic, reinforced by attacks on 
communal property, the displacement of the handicraft industry, a growth in 
disease among livestock and migrations to the new cash-cropping rubber 
producing zones, caused population decline between 1867 and 1880.30 
Later, railway construction in Mexico - the building of embankments and 
irrigation ditches - intensified health problems by causing floods, contamina-
tion of the water supply and the creation of breeding sites for mosquitoes. 
Railway construction - the building of embankments and irrigation ditches -
intensified health problems by causing floods, contaminating the water supply 
and creating breeding sites for mosquitoes. During the Mexican Revolution 
of the 1910s railways accelerated the movement of yellow fever, prompting 
the United States to express concern at lack of sanitary inspection along the 
Mexican frontier.31 Troop mobilisations during the Revolution alerted army 
doctors, hospital personnel and President Alvaro Obregon to the desirability 
29 Mirta Zaida Lobato, 'Work and Conflict in the meat-packing industry, 
1900-1930', in Adelman (ed.), Essays in Argentine Labour History..., pp. 
112-41. 
30 David Block, Mission Culture on the Upper Amazon. Native Tradition, 
Jesuit Enterprise and Secular Policy in Mozos, 1660-1880 (Lincoln, Neb., 
1994), pp. 120, 167, 179. 
31 Armando Solorzano Ramos, 'The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico: 
Nationalism, public health and yellow fever (1911-1924)' (unpub. PhD 
thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1990), p. 106; Anne-Emanuelle Birn, 'Local 
health and foreign wealth: the Rockefeller Foundation's public health 
programs in Mexico, 1924-1951', (unpub. PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins 
University, 1993), p. 8. 
of diffusing preventive vaccines and immunisation techniques. Similarly, the 
expansion of the sugar-cane economy in Puerto Rico during the 1900s and 
1910s and the concomitant decline of the coffee sector meant that return 
migrants from the sugar-cane producing lowlands carried malaria to the once 
coffee-producing highlands.32 As late as the 1950s returning seasonal 
workers from the lowland plantations of Guatemala carried malaria parasites 
in the bloodstream that the bite of a mosquito could transmit to other 
highlanders.33 
Frontier areas, without traditions of philanthropy or presence of health 
professionals, could be especially risky. In the early twentieth century the 
nitrate towns of the northern Chilean frontier lacked the modern hospitals, 
sewer and water systems that Santiago and some provincial capitals 
possessed. Health deficiencies exacerbated by bad housing conditions (the 
nitrate encampments consisting of shacks built from scraps of lumber and old 
nitrate bags), rendered their inhabitants victim to outbreaks of bubonic 
plague.34 In frontier zones state capitalism was at times no more socially 
concerned than international capital, and could afford to be less so, because 
the state was both employer and arbiter. Twenty-three years elapsed between 
the discovery of oil in Patagonia in 1907 and an attempt to adopt a coherent 
social policy for the remote Argentine settlement of Comodoro Rivadavia. 
Labour militancy culminated in the strike of 1917, during which the oil 
workers fought for the introduction of medical and accident insurance, an 
adequate water supply, housing to replace the barracks and shacks where 
parasitic insects that caused purulent ulcers flourished, and food at affordable 
prices. An endemic water crisis was not resolved till 1920. Only belatedly did 
the Argentine state acknowledge in the oil zone what in the city of Buenos 
Aires it had long recognised: the link between social policy and a malleable 
labour supply.35 
32 Victor S. Clark et al., Porto Rico and its problems (Brookings 
Institution, Washington D.C., 1930), pp. 55-71. 
33 In spite of a downward trend in the death rate, from 24.8 per 1,000 
inhabitants in 1940 to 20.6 per 1,000 in 1955, Guatemala still had one of the 
world's highest death rates. Compare 13.3 per 1,000 inhabitants in Mexico 
in 1955 and 14.8 per 1,000 in Ecuador in the same year. Nathan L. Whetten, 
Guatemala- the land and the people (New Haven, 1961), p. 212. 
34 Michael Monteon, Chile in the Nitrate Era. The evolution of economic 
dependence, 1880-1930 (Madison, Wis., 1982), pp. 60, 90-1. 
35 Carl E. Solberg, Oil and nationalism in Argentina. A history (Stanford, 
1979), esp. pp. 97-8. 
Inflexible attitudes that antedated the era of desarrollo hacia afuera often 
outlived the genesis of a modern public health policy. Scapegoating, apathy, 
panic and temporary movements of population from infected to salubrious 
areas were commonplace responses. Scapegoating was one way of handling 
epidemic. Immigrants, pilgrims, refugees and nomads made convenient 
scapegoats. Italian immigrants were accused of importing the nationwide 
cholera epidemic to Argentina that killed 400-500 people in Salta alone in 
1886-7.36 Portuguese and Italian immigrants, the victims of overcrowding, 
food inadequacies and poor sanitary facilities in the hostels of the Brazilian 
port of Santos, were readily scapegoated.37 German immigrant professors 
were blamed by Chilean clericals for high beer consumption and alcoholism 
in Santiago.38 Chinese contract labourers and their descendants in Cuba 
were held responsible for drug addiction. And during the early twentieth 
century Haitian and Jamaican black labour in Cuba became scapegoats for 
malaria, smallpox and other diseases. Indeed, the apparent association of 
black labour with particular diseases was used as part of the case for 
promoting white immigration; and a 'black scare' was probably orchestrated 
from the presidential palace in Havana in order to raise the price of permits 
to import black contract labour from Haiti and the British West Indian 
colonies. Disease provided a rationale for racism that concealed the irony that 
the quinquennium of the greatest reduction in the Cuban mortality rate (1920-
5) was that of greatest Haitian and Jamaican immigration.39 
Poor women also made convenient scapegoats. Imported from Madeira and 
the Azores out of a fear of the growth of homosexuality among Portuguese 
immigrant clerks and shop assistants, prostitutes were victimised for 
36 James R. Scobie (completed anded. Samuel L. Baily), Secondary Cities 
of Argentina. The Social History of Corrientes, Salta and Mendoza, 1850-
1910 (Stanford, 1988), p. 97. 
37 Thomas H. Holloway, Immigrants on the Land. Coffee and Society in 
Sao Paulo, 1886-1934 (Chapel Hill, NC., 1980), esp. p. 153. 
38 Carl Solberg, Immigration and Nationalism. Argentinaand Chile. 1890-
1914 (Austin, Tx., 1970), esp. pp. 77-8. 
39 Juan Perez de la Riva, 'Cuba y la migration antillana 1900-1931', in La 
republica neocolonial. Anuario de estudios Tomo II (Havana, 1979), pp. 1-
76. 
transmitting venereal diseases into the 'bosoms of families' in Rio de 
Janeiro.40 Wet-nurses and unlicensed midwives suffered similarly. In Rio 
in the 1850s they were seen as figures of nurture and care; but by the 1890s 
their image among the upper class had altered radically. The spectre of 
transmission from the urban slums of syphilis, tuberculosis, yaws and 
elephantiasis through the body's milk to the baby haunted the carioca upper 
class, generating pressure for the medical examination of wet-nurses. By 
1908 wet-nurses came to see that medical examination was useful because 
they could claim to be professionally certified.41 
Apathy was commonplace too. At the beginning of the nineteenth century 
'enlightened' Spanish colonial administrators sent the Expedition of the 
Vaccine to Venezuela, Puerto Rico and elsewhere to vaccinate adults and 
children with Jenner's vaccine against smallpox. A lack of medical practi-
tioners and good roads and the awkwardness of the method of vaccination 
made it necessary to keep part of the susceptible population unprotected so 
that the supply of fluid could be maintained by the chain of vaccination. Thus 
the unvaccinated and the inadequately immunised population became infected 
when a case of smallpox was introduced to Puerto Rico.42 In spite of the 
possibility of Spain concentrating her energies on Cuba and Puerto Rico after 
the loss of her other American colonies, various smallpox epidemics occurred 
in both islands between the 1830s to the 1890s.43 The official response was 
an unenlightened indifference that was so complete that the Expedition of the 
Vaccine was not part of the collective memory in Puerto Rico by 1930, the 
year of the report on the island by the prominent think-tank, the Brookings 
Institution, which asserted that there had been no public health measures in 
Puerto Rico before the arrival of the US Navy in 1899.44 
40 Luiz Carlos Soares, Prostitution in Nineteenth Century Rio de Janeiro 
(University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, Occasional 
Papers 17) (London, 1989), p. 9. 
41 Sandra Lauderdale Graham, House and Servant. The Domestic World 
of Servants and Masters in nineteenth century Rio de Janeiro (Cambridge, 
1988), esp. pp. 15, 132. 
42 Jose G. Rigau-Perez, 'The Introduction of Smallpox Vaccine in 1803 
and the Adoption of Immunization as a Government function in Puerto Rico', 
Hispanic American Historical Review (1989), pp. 393-424. 
43 Julio le Riverend, La Habana (Madrid, 1993), passim. 
44 Clark et al., Porto Rico..., pp. 55-71. 
Temporary migrations of prosperous minorities constituted another 
response to disease. When disease loomed in the cities the solution of the 
upper classes was to 'summer' elsewhere: the carioca upper class went out 
from the city of Rio de Janeiro to the hill-towns, like Petropolis; that from 
Salta in North-west Argentina to visit the mineral baths at San Lorenzo.45 
The upper class had a special fear of tuberculosis, as a social leveller that 
afflicted all social classes, nationalities and ethnic groups. One extreme 
response was to welcome disease and, indeed, to invite more when epidemic 
disease hit immigrants, but barely touched largely immune local populations. 
Thus 'Our good friend', yellow fever, 'the true, perhaps the only, patriot of 
the empire' was welcomed in the mid-nineteenth century by some Brazilians 
because it killed off so many Portuguese.46 Similarly, nationalist Mexican 
physicians, hostile to the yellow fever campaigns conducted by the Rocke-
feller Foundation in the early 1920s, contended that 'The fever that 
devastates us is not just yellow but golden. It is not stegomyia that produces 
the virus, but the Oil Companies and the institutions working with them, not 
in the form of mosquitoes but in the form of doctors...'.47 
The overall picture was uneven. By the World Depression most Latin 
American governments possessed the knowledge and the basic competence 
to confront the most acute problems of epidemic and to handle those endemic 
diseases which were believed 'controllable'. Imbued with positivistic and 
progressive (and, in places, radical and socialist) ideas, the medical 
profession and the public health apparati usually received the collaboration 
of national policy-making elites as well as much of international and national 
business and the early trade unions. However, the risk of breakdown and 
decomposition of the state, as highlighted by the Mexican Revolution, 
remained. Efficacy at national level was not always complemented by 
efficiency at state/departmental or city level or in strategically located sea 
and river ports. Obsolete responses to outbreaks of disease proved as resilient 
as other archaic features of Latin American societies. 
45 James Scobie, Secondary Cities of Argentina, p. 99; Jeffrey E. Needell, 
A Tropical Belle Epoque. Elite Culture and Society in turn-of-the-century Rio 
de Janeiro (Cambridge, 1983), p. 149. 
46 June E. Hahner, Poverty and Politics. The Urban Poor in Brazil, 1870-
1920 (Albuquerque, NM., 1969), p. 142. 
47 Cited in Solorzano Ramos, 'The Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico...', 
p. 187. 
External Forces and Domestic Influences 
The insertion of Latin America into the international economy meant that 
external forces played an important part in shaping Latin American policies 
in hygiene and sanitation. Overseas charitable agencies, official missions 
commissioned by governments in developed countries and US philanthropic 
foundations all played a part. The British, the leading external influence in 
most of Latin America till the First World War, played a small part in 
influencing trends in health issues, as was illustrated by the work of the 
National Vigilance Association. The French, who exercised a profound 
influence in medical education and tropical medicine, played a more 
important role that was exemplified by the export of a mission of scientists 
from the Institut Pasteur founded in 1885 to Rio de Janeiro. The United 
States countered French influences, and displaced them finally following the 
Fall of France in 1940. The work of the Rockefeller Foundation missions 
consolidated an informal philanthropic presence in numerous countries. A 
shift from France as the main external force in health issues to the United 
States was symbolised by the experience of the Panama Canal between the 
1880s and 1920s. 
A successor of the British voluntary agencies that combated the interna-
tional trade in black slaves, the National Vigilance Association, struggled 
against the 'white slave' trade, especially in Argentina,48 sponsoring an anti-
white slavery conference in 1899. The Association became inescapably 
involved in debates about how best to confront venereal diseases. Should 
legal bordellos, supervised by police and medical personnel, be allowed, 
perhaps even encouraged? In Buenos Aires advocates of licensed prostitution 
claimed, echoing European debates, that it could reduce venereal infections 
among troops and other vulnerable male youth, prevent the birth of defective 
children, compensate for the failure of philanthropic organisations to find 
work for poor mothers, promote better health practices among the poor, and 
create new sources of municipal revenue. During the polemics of the 1890s 
and 1920s British women philanthropists, struggling against prostitution 
whether licensed or not, sponsored moral reform movements to protect 
European women ensnared by the 'white slave trade', and pressed the League 
of Nations to take energetic action. Singleminded in its concern for European 
prostitutes, the Association was open to charges of a racist indifference to the 
plight of Argentine prostitutes and those distant from the port of Buenos 
Aires, and also a lack of concern for Latin American prostitutes recruited to 
48 Victor Hugo coined the term. 
work in Europe.49 The impact of the National Vigilance Association was 
limited. The debate about the 'white slave trade' indicated the fragility of 
British philanthropic pressure in an increasingly self-confident sovereign 
republic, where the Association built few durable alliances with national 
political parties, professional groups and business elites, where British 
diplomats and businessmen had very different priorities, and where medical 
professionals debated the merits of licensed prostitution rather then its total 
abolition. 
Official pressure exerted by France upon Brazil had more significance than 
philanthropic pressure upon Argentina from Britain, largely because a French 
mission to Rio de Janeiro secured allies among carioca professional elites and 
elements in federal government by being identified with science and progress. 
In the 1890s discoveries by the first generation of Brazilian semi-selftaught 
bacteriologists were not recognised in Paris, because they did not conform 
to strictly professional criteria: caution in building experimental systems, 
care in repeating experiments, and patience in performing necessary controls 
before publishing conclusions. Brazilian scientists wanted French endorse-
ment and support; and the French wanted a locale in the tropics where they 
could mount experiments in collaboration with a nucleus of capable local 
scientists. The Pasteur mission went to Rio de Janeiro in 1901, and played a 
vital part in raising levels of science and establishing a high degree of 
professionalism in bacteriology (especially studies of yellow fever) and 
tropical medicine. Composed of bacteriologists from the Pasteur Institute 
with experience in the French Asian and African colonies, China and 
Portugal, the mission was financed by the French government, following 
merchant pressures on the Chamber of Deputies. Afraid of the damage to 
imperial trade that long quarantine periods in the tropics caused, French 
merchants wanted the government in Paris to evaluate the recommendations 
of the mission led by Walter Reed to Cuba.50 In 1902-3 the Pasteur Mission 
gave Brazilian scientists the recognition they desired by confirming that 
Adolfo Ruiz had successfully induced yellow fever in three healthy volunteers 
by bites of infected Stegomyia mosquitoes at the isolation hospital in Sao 
Paulo. The Mission also met the anxieties of French merchants by recom-
mending that strict sanitary measures aimed at preventing the transmission 
of contaminated mosquitoes and their eggs and larvae between ports be 
49 Donna J. Guy, Sex and Danger in Buenos Aires. Prostitution, Family 
and Nutrition in Argentina (Lincoln, Neb., 1991; Guy, 'Medical Imperialism 
gone awry: the campaign against legalized prostitution in Latin America', in 
Teresa Meade and Mark Walker (eds.), Science, medicine and Cultural 
Imperialism (London, 1991), pp. 75-94. 
50 On the Reed mission, see below, pp. XXXXX. 
applied, while unnecessary quarantines were relaxed.51 The Pasteur mission 
had the effect of both reinvigorating Brazilian scientific expertise and 
consolidating links between Brazil and France in the experimental sciences, 
public health policy and postgraduate medical education. 
Official French missions to Latin America were complemented and rivalled 
by US philanthropic missions. Vaunting itself as the vanguard institution of 
international 'scientific philanthropy', the Rockefeller Foundation played an 
important role in various countries - Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, 
Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Peru and elsewhere - from the First World War. The 
International Health Board/Division (IHB/D)52 of the Foundation diffused 
an ideology of professionalism, and aimed to secure the recognition and 
support of power elites and the confidence of public opinion.53 The IHB/D 
created health institutions that had clear lines of responsibility and issued 
standardised reports. It founded organisations to combat targeted diseases, 
like hookworm, and public health laboratories that identified the microscopic 
organisms that caused infection and sometimes evolved into broader public 
health services. Underlying the export of public health measures was, as 
Anne-Emanuelle Birn stresses, the export of assumptions of 'Western' 
science regarding care, repair and pain mitigation and an ideological and 
philosophical orientation that stressed a Cartesian duality between the mind 
and the body, a mechanistic view of the body and an allopathic duality 
between prevention and cure.54 Beginning from an assumption that the 
promotion of the highest quality of scientific research was linked with making 
the greatest progress in preventing disease, the IHB/D fostered the training 
of Latin Americans in the United States, and gave a stimulus to the diffusion 
of medical knowledge; and the IHB/D placed a special stress on 
epidemiological activities, that included enquiries into public health 
administration. From 1921 the Foundation funded scholarships for Mexican 
medical students to attend Johns Hopkins University, and financed the 
51 liana Lowy, 'Yellow Fever in Rio de Janeiro and the Pasteur Mission 
(1901-1905): the transfer of Science to the Periphery', Medical History, vol. 
34, no. 2, Apr. 1990, pp. 144-63. 
52 The name became IHD from April 1927. However, for clarity, all 
references in this paper will be in the form IHB/D. 
53E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men. Medicine and Capitalism 
in America (Berkeley, 1979), esp. pp. 18-24. 
54 Anne-Emanuelle Birn, 'Local Health and Foreign Wealth: the 
Rockefeller Foundation's Pubic Health Programs in Mexico, 1924-1951' 
(unpub. PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1993), esp. p. 13. 
Spanish translation and edition of the Journal of the American Medical 
Association. Stereotyping French cultural influence as responsible for neglect 
of experimental science, part-time magisterial teaching and an overemphasis 
on verbal expression, the Foundation promoted changes in medical and 
nursing education and midwifery training and practice.55 The IHB/D 
diffused research findings and financed vital personnel, such as two leading 
Cuban epidemiologists who conducted early work against yellow fever in the 
Yucateno town of Merida, an epidemic centre seen as a menace to the ports 
of Cuba, Mexico and Central America. In 1923 the Foundation assisted a 
campaign involving the screening of houses, petrolisation and the use of fish 
that was intended to 'eradicate' yellow fever from the Mexican regions of 
Yucatan and Campeche. This campaign had a particular symbolic resonance 
in much of Mexico, because the spread of yellow fever was believed to have 
been the cause of the decline of the Mayan civilisation.56 
The presence of the IHB/D in Latin America was not unambiguous. 
Aligning its priorities with those of the 'international scientific community', 
the Foundation set out to foster a climate sympathetic to foreign investment 
and international trade, rather than specifically to back the interests of the 
Rockefeller empire. Projecting its work as authoritative, rational and as a 
force promoting social harmony, the Foundation was careful that the 
formulation and execution of its programmes should not slip from the hands 
of a manifestly undemocratic group of professional managers.57 In the inter-
war period various of the employees of the IHB/D, imbued with a condescen-
sion born of 'scientific racism', treated Latin Americans as victims of 
'extensive biological dilution of the European race'. Foundation personnel 
began from blinkered assumptions that the indigenous populations were 
55 Marcos Cueto, 'Visions of Science and Development. The Rockefeller 
Foundation's Latin American Surveys of the 1920s', in M. Cueto (ed.), 
Missionaries of Science. The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1994), pp. 1-22. The claim of the United States to 
superior 'science' in midwifery was especially specious. Whereas Spain 
began to regulate midwifery in the empire during the eighteenth century, and 
various European countries trained midwives and integrated them into health-
care arrangements, no such systematic drive occurred in most of the United 
States, where some state medical services allowed the medical profession to 
'commandeer' the practice of obstetrics and recommended a general ban on 
midwifery. Birn, 'Local Health and Foreign Wealth', pp. 196-7. 
56 Solorzano Ramos, 'The Rockefeller Foundation...', pp. 156, 221, 339. 
57 Robert Amove (ed.), Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: the 
Foundations at Home and Abroad (Boston, Mass, 1980), passim. 
morally and scientifically backward, and, that contrary to archaeological 
evidence of Aztec cultures, notions of sanitation, disease control and personal 
cleanliness, were alien to them.58 
The Foundation met with a wide diversity of response. In the 1920s the 
IHB/D expected to encounter the resistance of the monopolist of national 
philanthropy in Colombia, the Roman Catholic Church; it found, however, 
only collaboration, until it backed lay nursing initiatives against the religious 
orders in the 1940s.59 During the 1920s the IHB/D met in Colombia with a 
blind faith in the benefits of US friendship, while in the 1930s it experienced 
a trend towards pragmatic nationalism.60 In Brazil the IHB/D encountered 
much sympathy among the nuclei of modern public health expertise, together 
with some suspicion that the Foundation constituted the 'advance guard' of 
imperialist penetration, and some concern when it proposed technical rather 
than politically acceptable solutions. Foundation employees rejected, for 
example, fumigation practices against yellow fever, that they regarded as 
political showpieces which concealed management deficiencies, and pressed 
to replace them with less politically appealing but more persistently intrusive 
anti-larval work, like control of mosquito breeding places.61 In Argentina 
the IHB/D came up against the relentless opposition of Peronism in the late 
1940s and 1950s, and gradually withdrew its support from the work of the 
Nobel Prize-winning physiologist, Bernard Houssay, as he approached 
retirement and his more distinguished associates died or retired.62 
58 Birn, 'Local health and Foreign Wealth', esp. p. 94. 
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In Mexico the IHB/D met with pragmatic nationalism, a strong xenophobia 
and a cordial welcome, according to the timing of its arrival and local 
conditions. The IHB/D believed that Mexico could follow the US model for 
the control of hookworm, because the Mexican government was organised 
along tripartite lines, with responsibilities divided between the federal, state 
and municipal governments. Aiming at a discreet anonymity during anti-
hookworm campaigns in 1923, the Foundation was especially careful not to 
be overidentified with the United Fruit Company or the Aguila Oil Company 
(of Veracruz), which were the foci of nationalist agitation. Nevertheless, 
treatment of hookworm with cheropodium evoked a nationalist response from 
medical professionals, who argued that cheropodium should be used only as 
a last resort owing to its extreme toxicity, that the pharmaceutical companies 
failed to provide medicine chests to treat adverse reactions to the drugs they 
sold, and that the problem of reinfection was given insufficient emphasis by 
officials of the anti-hookworm campaign, in spite of its importance in terms 
of costs, health education, community sanitation and personal hygiene. 
Foundation officials also confronted the resistance of well-informed federal 
government officials, notably Miguel Bustamante, a public health leader for 
over half a century, who was the main architect of a plan in the 1920s to 
establish permanent rural hygiene services in place of the mobile health 
brigades that vaccinated peasants and rural labourers against typhoid and 
smallpox, treated the rural population for intestinal parasites, and gave 
general medical examinations. Determined to defend what he perceived as 
national public health sovereignty, Bustamante clashed briefly with IHB/D 
representatives. He argued that Mexico had absorbed the lessons of 
international public health from the distilled experience of the League of 
Nations, American Public Health Association and Johns Hopkins School of 
Hygiene and Public Health, and had the capacity to evolve its own public 
health programme. However, the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the Foundation was never one of overt hostility. Indeed, when a 
renewal of the agrarian radicalism of the 1910s threatened to erupt in 
Morelos in 1924, the Mexican government endorsed the selection by the 
IHB/D of the region for a campaign. And, although President Lazaro 
Cardenas (1934-40) criticised the role and character of IHB/D-managed 
sanitary units, he continued prudently to fund IHB/D projects so as not to 
offend the Foundation, while funding exclusively state-managed rural health 
units more generously. By avoiding confrontation, Rockefeller officials 
hoped subtly to influence the conceptualisation and practice of public health 
reform in Mexico, and probably succeeded.63 
Some authors have argued that the IHB/D promoted security, stability, 
63 Birn, 'Local health and Foreign Wealth', esp. pp. 99, 112, 124-5, 154-
7, 176, 190, 204, 240, 282. 
property, modernisation (and, in Mexico in the late 1910s and early 1920s, 
the Obregon faction); and addressed the symptoms of the problem of poverty, 
not the causes. To take one such comment: 'When the people demanded a 
public health campaign against malaria, the Rockefeller Foundation offered 
a campaign against yellow fever; when the peasants perceived that their 
wellbeing was linked to the ownership of the land, the Rockefeller Founda-
tion advised the Mexican government to carry out a campaign against 
hookworm... The immediate health needs of the peasants, such as improve-
ment of nutrition, water supply, wage increases, better sanitary conditions, 
and hygienic housing were translated by the Rockefeller Foundation into a 
campaign combatting vectors, filling in swamps and insecticide spraying.'64 
Foundation officials overlooked the problem that sanitary techniques like 
draining rice fields to eliminate mosquito breeding sites threatened peasant 
livelihoods, and were blind to resentments among rural labourers that the best 
pit latrines installed by the IHB/D during the anti-hookworm campaigns were 
of a higher standard than their housing. Furthermore, the scientific creden-
tials boasted by the Foundation were not unimpeachable. The Foundation's 
advocacy in the early 1920s of the Noguchi vaccine against yellow fever for 
Mexican soldiers proved to be ill-advised, when a few years later the vaccine 
was shown to be based upon scientific error and to be useless.65 
The construction of the Panama Canal consolidated US influence in 
northern Latin America and the Caribbean. Not only did it constitute a 
display of US engineering prowess, it embodied the first major blow to a 
French ascendancy in 'tropical' medicine. In the 1880s the isthmus of 
Panama was a symbol of death and disease throughout the Americas; by the 
1920s the Canal Zone enjoyed a hemispheric reputation for salubriousness. 
In the late 1880s the French were determined to fulfil their contract to 
complete the isthmian canal. Recalling the decisive role that disease had 
played in the defeat of their compatriots by insurgents in Saint Domingue 
almost a century before, French physicians distributed quinine on a regular 
basis free among their compatriots as a preventive move against malaria 
(paludisme - marsh fever).66 However, mismanagement and corruption 
64 Solorzano Ramos, 'The Rockefeller Foundation...', pp. 228, 273-4, 
341-2. 
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66 The detection in Algeria by Alphonse Laveran of tiny crescent-shaped 
bodies in a blood sample taken from a malaria patient had already taken 
place, but was not acted upon because miasma theory remained unshakeable. 
thwarted the canal project; and the French had no contractual authority to 
enforce public health regulations. Devastating outbreaks of yellow fever and 
malaria played a decisive part in halting their project.67 Though US 
personnel who replaced the French branded the engineer,68 Ferdinand de 
Lesseps, 'the Great Undertaker', the US performance in hygiene and 
sanitation was itself erratic and uneven. 
Yellow fever epidemics struck in 1885, 1886, 1902 and again less severely 
in 1905. Reformers such as Colonel William C. Gorgas exploited lurid 
images in the US press of 'yellow fever winds' that carried the supposedly 
airborne disease in the 'white men's graveyard', in order to raise levels of 
spending on sanitary works. Images of fever-breeding fogs ('Creeping 
Johnny'), swamps, poisonous aquatic plants, devouring jungles and 
enveloping bogs pervaded some US newspapers.69 Coffin manufacturers 
prospered. The Star and Herald carried the poem Yellow Eyes by a one-time 
resident of the Panamanian port of Colon, James Stanley Gilbert: 
You are going to have the fever, 
Yellow Eyes! 
In about ten days from now 
Iron Bands will clamp your brow; 
Your tongue resemble curdled cream, 
A rusty streak the center seam; 
Your mouth will taste of untold things, 
With claws and horns and fins and wings; 
Your head will wear a ton or more, 
And forty gales within it roar! 70 
Three-quarters of US personnel panicked in 'the Great Scare' of 1905 and 
left Panama for home, even though the epidemic of that year was less grave 
than its predecessors. Only slowly, however, did press agitation arouse 
sufficient embarrassment at mismanagement that emergency sanitation 
services were created. Meanwhile, the Yellow Fever Commission and 
67 John Major, Prize Possession. The United States and the Panama Canal 
1903-1975 (Cambridge, 1993), p. 27. 
68 Hero of Suez, failure in Panama. 
69 Miles P. Duval Jr., Cadiz to Cathay - the Long Diplomatic Struggle for 
the Panama Canal (2nd edn., Stanford, 1947), p. 306. 
70 Cited in David McCullough, The Path between the Seas. The Creation 
of the Panama Canal 1870-1914 (New York, 1977), p. 453. 
Colonel Gorgas worked to combat yellow fever. They took some practical, 
pragmatic steps: a hospital car on the Panama Railroad served as a de facto 
ambulance; and a refrigerator car and cold-storage plants were introduced.71 
Properties were inspected and fumigated on public health grounds. But 
conscientiousness was easily confused with overzealousness. Householders 
resisted repeated disinfections owing to sulphur and pyrethrum fumes; some 
properties were expropriated; and some Catholics were offended by an order 
that the holy water in Colon Cathedral should be changed daily after a dead 
mosquito was found there, and interpreted the instruction as evidence of a 
subtle form of Protestant persecution.72 
From the 1880s major employers in the Panamanian isthmus responded to 
labour shortages by importing British West Indian labour. The pseudo-
scientific assumption that blacks were immune to yellow fever remained 
potent; in fact, many black contract workers enjoyed an immunity because 
they had suffered a mild case of the disease, often in childhood. Large, 
unquantifiable numbers of blacks succumbed to yellow fever and malaria. To 
avoid panic, yellow fever was seldom listed as a cause of death, and gastritis 
was recorded instead.73 The corpses of some West Indians were said to have 
been dumped. 
The US authorities answered outbreaks of yellow fever, bubonic plague 
and malaria with an unpredictable mixture of rational measures, insensitive 
authoritarianism and panic. After the diagnosis of the death of a Barbadian 
docker in 1902 was confirmed by autopsy as bubonic plague, La Boca wharf 
was placed under immediate quarantine. Buildings, clothing and bedding 
were sprayed systematically with a solution of bichloride of mercury; chicken 
coops and animal pens were seized and burnt; and latrines were demolished. 
The authorities in Panama City paid a bounty of ten cents for each rat or 
mouse handed in. Yet these measures were insufficient to allay the anxieties 
of US trade union leaders about shipments of workers to 'that deathtrap', 
especially after a team of Japanese inspectors representing large Japanese 
71 Miles P. Duval Jr., And the Mountain will move. The Story of the 
Building of the Panama Canal (Stanford, 1947), p. 179. 
72 McCullough, The Path between the Seas, pp. 448, 452. 
73 McCullough, The Path between the Seas..., esp. p. 173; Velma 
Newton, The Silver Men. West Indian Labour Migration to Panama 
(Kingston, Jamaica, 1987), pp. 126-8. Tuberculosis was also a commonplace 
disease among West Indian workers. 
labour contractors denounced the isthmus as unsafe for Japanese workers.74 
In 1906 Chief Engineer John F. Stevens lamented that 4 in the diseased 
imagination of the disjointed forces of white employees, hovered the angel 
of death in the form of Yellow Fever'.75 The reputation of the Canal 
improved slowly after Walter Reed confirmed the finding of Carlos Finlay 
that the mosquito Stegomyia fasciata (Aedes aegypti) transmitted yellow 
fever. Only a visit by Theodore Roosevelt prompted the establishment of a 
separate Sanitation Department. 
Once the Canal was built the authorities aimed to improve the working and 
living conditions of white, especially skilled, workers, for whom orderly 
communities with restaurants and sports facilities were provided; but many 
black workers lived outside the Canal Zone amidst inferior sanitation 
conditions and medical treatment. Confronted by problems of train derail-
ments, dynamite explosions, landslides, boats sinking and falls of scaffolding 
in the construction of locks and gates, the Canal authorities expanded hospital 
provision. After Jamaican workers rioted over housing conditions and food 
quality in 1905, the authorities debated the merits of a guaranteed basic 
nutritional intake for black West Indians, together with daily doses of 
quinine, some family housing and a limited health service.76 Action was 
taken at a leisurely pace between 1906 and 1912. Two factors limited the 
achievements of the Canal Zone authorities. One was wrangling over who 
should pay. There were fractious discussions over whether the United States 
or the cities of Panama and Colon had the responsibility for paying the capital 
and maintenance costs of their water and sewage systems.77 Another was 
misconceived, misdirected policy. A combination of moralising zeal and 
health concern was manifest in the introduction in 1904 of unenforceable 
restrictions on gambling, the import of narcotics and the immigration of 
prostitutes. These concerns reached a peak in 1918 in the context of 
74 McCullough, The Path between the Seas..., p. 453. 
75 Duval, And the Mountains will Move..., p. 188. 
76 Michael L. Conniff, Black Labor on a White Canal, Panama, 1904-
1981 (Pittsburgh, 1985), p. 31; Lancelot S. Smith, The West Indian in 
Panama, 1850-1914 (Washington, D.C., 1980), pp. 45-53. 
77 Major, Prize Possession..., pp. 32,43, 44. A daily bath was a privilege 
of the wealthy. The same water was used to wash children, then to launder 
clothes, scrub floors and clean pavements. Duval Jr., And the Mountain will 
Move..., esp. p. 147. Furthermore, nutrition changes were limited by the 
absence of refrigerated meat, fresh milk and fruit, butter (except tinned), and 
uncontaminated bread. 
teetotaller fanaticism in the United States. Pressures for a bone-dry, dope-
free, whore-free Canal Zone came from groups like the Women's Home 
Missionary Society, which urged the federal government 'to do all in your 
power to close the Brothels and the Saloons.. .for the protection of our boys'. 
To appease pressures at home the US authorities encroached on the powers 
of the nascent Panamanian state, so that even in the 1920s Panama remained 
a client state in health questions, and was denied the power to exercise all 
public regulations.78 Yet the Canal Zone was acquiring a reputation for 
salubriousness and high quality hospital services. By 1923 senior Colombian 
surgeons were anxious to modernise hospital care in Bogota, because their 
wealthiest patients were opting to go by air to Panama rather than enter 
clinics in the Colombian capital.79 
Foreign pressures with regard to health questions had an enduring 
significance for Latin America. The impact of the Pasteur mission was more 
modest, and its presence more shortlived, than that of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. Yet the Pasteur mission to Brazil played a critical part in 
developing, accelerating and catalysing pre-existing trends in that country, 
and in placing Brazil in the Latin American vanguard in research and control 
of various 'tropical' diseases. The Rockefeller Foundation set out to promote 
the control of specific diseases by means of field investigations, practical 
demonstrations and laboratory research; to encourage the development of 
public health education; and to supply aid to government - national and local 
- in such ways as to put health work on a permanent basis. 
Precisely because its aims were more ambitious, the Rockefeller missions 
had more difficulty than the Pasteur in achieving them. The French had only 
to enlist the co-operation of small scientific and governing elites; Rockefeller 
looked to co-operation that extended to sanitary inspectors and even parish 
clergy, who were less preoccupied than cosmopolitan city elites with 
'Europeanising' (or 'Americanising') ideals, or with removing barriers to 
international trade, and were at times opposed to them. Perhaps more 
significant, at least till the late 1920s, was the Panama Canal, which 
demonstrated conclusively that where capital, technology and skilled 
management and labour were effectively marshalled, and then combined with 
political will and administrative commitment, major impediments to the 
control of endemic and epidemic diseases could be surmounted. The 
78 Major, Prize Possession..., pp. 139, 146, 254. 
79 See my article, 'External Philanthropy and Domestic Change in 
Colombian Health Care: the role of the Rockefeller Foundation, ca. 1920-
1950', to appear in Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 75, no. 3, 
1995, pp. 339-76 
experience in health care of the Canal Zone had both intended and unintended 
effects: it served as a model for public hygiene and sanitation throughout 
'tropical' Latin America - an object to be emulated both by US occupation 
governments in the Caribbean and Nicaragua (and the Philippines), and by 
independent republics; and it had the unintended effect of setting new 
standards of hospital care. 
Policy in the City and the Countryside, especially Brazil 
Of the national historiographies only the Brazilian is sufficiently advanced to 
yield a synthesis of public health achievement for the period between the mid-
nineteenth century and the World Depression. Recent scholarship has 
explored several aspects of change in the city of Rio de Janeiro, and has 
begun to clarify the early stages of public health activity in the Brazilian 
countryside. 
In the burgeoning nineteenth-century city of Rio de Janeiro bacterial, 
parasitic and viral diseases joined to debilitate and kill populations. As one 
of the first large urban conglomerations of the continent, Rio was a pioneer 
in tackling the consequences of population density and overcrowding and 
recognising the need for modern sewage and drainage systems and the 
regulation of cemeteries and abattoirs. In mid-century the City contracted a 
British company to lay plumbing throughout the city - 670 street corner 
spigots and piping to 2,000 houses, and additional water was channelled from 
mountain streams.80 As the city grew, a trend towards residential segrega-
tion by social class was more marked. The poor were increasingly concen-
trated in congested corticos (beehives). This was high-density, low-income 
housing where high rents reduced spending on essential food items, thus 
worsening nutritional deficiencies, which turned some diseases, like 
whooping cough, measles and gastroenteritis into killers. Incremental 
improvements were recorded. Private firms were contracted to empty 
accumulated kitchen garbage and fecal matter; and better constructed streets 
were built that sloped to the centre to carry waste away.81 
80 High bacteria counts in uncovered reservoirs occurred. 
81 Sandra Lauderdale Graham, The Domestic World of Slaves and Masters 
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By the 1880s, the use of piped water was changing social customs. 
Laundering and bathing at home became more common, except when, as 
happened frequently, the water supply was cut. During the Brazilian belle 
epoque the main concern of senior public hygiene personnel was to take 
measures that limited the spread of contagion. Thus, at intervals, populations 
were evacuated from infected tenement buildings; the size of funeral 
processions was limited; latrines were disinfected (and deeper ones built). 
Action was taken to put an end to heaps of decomposing rubble; and meat was 
treated as garbage if it was not consumed on the day that the animal was 
slaughtered.82 Towards the end of the century the first moves were taken to 
establish maternity hospitals, because women, especially those with an 
impaired health, inadequate diet and heavy work, were subject to puerperal 
and neo-natal diseases. In 1901 the Institute of Protection and Infant Welfare 
was opened to help poor women and their children. These were circum-
stances in which pioneering women physicians made some headway, 
benefiting from the recognition by some male doctors that women patients 
were often reluctant to expose their bodies to men. Although the argument 
that the brain size of women precluded them from serious abstract study 
proved highly resilient, twelve women students (there were 139 men) had 
received state financial assistance from Dom Pedro II to study abroad, two 
of them pioneering women physicians, one a precocious fourteen-year-old. 
By 1907, according to official statistics, there were six women students of 
medicine in Brazil, 9 of obstetrics, 22 of dentistry, and 56 of pharmacy, a 
profession of declining prestige.83 
Demanding the creation of a 'civilised city' and of a vigorous, healthy 
citizenry as prerequisites of material progress, city elites responded to 
demands from hygienists that urban policy should rescue Rio from ' tropical-
ity' and 'climatic degeneracy'.84 Physicians played an active role in city 
institutions. From the 1890s public health reform evolved as a major 
ingredient of urban reform from above, that went beyond sanitation 
campaigns aimed at reducing the risk of the spread of infectious disease from 
the slums. Draconian sanitation crusades involved compulsory vaccination 
82 Lauderdale Graham, House and Street..., esp. pp. 82-4; Hahner, 
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and notification of infectious disease, the combing of the city for mosquitoes 
and grey rats, the enforced isolation of victims, the disinfection of many 
houses and the demolition of some. In 1893 the main symbol of resistance to 
authoritarian sanitation policy, the Cortigo Cabega de Porco (Pig's Head), 
was finally demolished by the police with support from the infantry and 
cavalry, after defying orders to close for fifty-three years.85 Tackling the 
problem of under-reporting of mortality from yellow fever and bubonic 
plague, President Francisco Rodriguez Alves expanded the powers of the 
Federal Department of Health, established finally in 1894 after several failed 
attempts, to include double-checking reported causes of death. 
Draconian action aroused protest. There was the resistance, of course, of 
the slum landlords. But there were also questions about the nature of the 
sanitation campaigns. Were they as scientific as their exponents claimed? 
Was public health legislation coherent and consistent? Were the campaigns 
illiberal? Was social regulation consistent with laissez-faire orthodoxies, even 
when applied only selectively? Warning that medicine could become an 
instrument of oppression, the Positivist Apostolate denounced moves towards 
a national sanitary code, questioned the efficacy of vaccines, and condemned 
coercion, while joining the French-based Ligue Internationale contre la 
Vaccination. There was widespread anger at the invasion of domestic privacy 
by the police; there was anger too at the invasion of the bodies of women by 
the medical authorities. Vaccination, it was argued, was an invasion of the 
last bastion of privacy, the human body, which was fast becoming an 
experimental laboratory. Some parts of the press contended that an expansion 
of federal controls concealed the determination of a paulista president to 
impose his will upon Rio, and fanned opposition to the invasion of private 
housing by what it called 'mosquito swatters'. These grievances reflected 
broader conflicts over the distribution of wealth and power. Elements in the 
civilian elite and in the officer corps manipulated popular discontent over 
housing, unemployment and food inflation, which exploded in the Vaccine 
Uprising of 1904. Violent clashes of troops and demonstrators, and 
skirmishes among rival military factions took place.86 
Applying to the countryside the principles that enjoyed a qualified success 
in the cities was problematic. Measured by the mortality rates of the period, 
rural health conditions were worse than urban. But, except where entrepre-
neurs left documents, evidence about them is scanty until the beginnings of 
modern public health studies, complemented by the work of rural sociol-
85 Lauderdale Graham, House and Street..., esp. pp. 120, 127. 
86 Lauderdale Graham, House and Street..., esp. pp. 129,133-5; Hahner, 
Poverty and Politics..., p. 179. 
ogists, social anthropologists and nutritionists. An important exception was 
the pioneering survey of conditions in the sertoes (backlands) of the Brazilian 
nordeste - Bahia, Pernambuco, Piaui and Goias - made by Belisario Pena and 
Artur Neiva, members of the Cruz Institute created out of the Pasteur 
mission. Pena and Neiva drew the attention of informed opinion to the 'great 
endemics of the backlands', and clarified the reasons for high levels of infant 
mortality. They demonstrated that the high death rates associated with 
malaria and intestinal infections were aggravated by the prohibitively high 
cost of quinine, which caused parents to resort to herbal remedies. The 
survey awakened sufficient public interest for Carlos Chagas to be financed 
to study the insect transmitter of Trypanosoma cruci (Chagas' disease) on the 
banks of the Preto River, a tributary of the Sao Francisco, in Minas Gerais. 
Pena's polemical pamphlet, Saneamiento do Brasil (Cleaning up Brazil 
published in 1918, recommended legislation and a process of administrative 
action to combat hookworm, malaria and, to a lesser extent, Chagas' disease. 
Inspired by the work of Pena, Chagas and Neiva, the federal health service 
began sustained work in the countryside in the 1920s. Supported by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and backed by publicists arguing that good health 
conditions were essential to the full entry of the population of the hinterland 
into the national polity, culture and markets, the federal initiative confronted 
the tenacious opposition of rural oligarchies that resisted intrusion from 
centralising elites. Disaffected elements of the urban middle class expressed 
alarm about the cost and efficacy of the campaigns, and claimed that gloomy 
reports of health conditions in the interior tarnished the international image 
of the country. National and regional elites were divided over the 'proper' 
level of state involvement, the authority that should be delegated to the 
federal and state bureaucracies and the timing of campaigns. The 'coffee 
oligarchy' had effectively resisted state surveillance of social, including 
health conditions, on the plantations before the First World War; but, as the 
flow of European immigrants threatened to dry up during the War, so the 
pressure to improve the health of the existing workforce grew. Sanitary 
services were extended to rural areas of the coffee-producing state of Sao 
Paulo, and to handle diseases like trachoma brought in by immigrants from 
Southern Europe. These measures preceded the establishment in 1925 of a 
Special Inspectorship of Labour Hygiene. Taking into account under-
reporting of deaths especially in the hinterland, the paulista progress in 
public health during the 1920s was impressive: the rate of mortality of the 
state as a whole fell from 21.0 per 1,000 in 1915 to 14.2 in 1929, and that of 
the city from 19.0 per 1,000 in 1921 to 12.7 in 1930.87 
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Campaigns led by the federal health service to 'rescue' the caboclos -
backlanders - began in the 1920s. The elites of the prosperous Centre-South 
where yellow fever and other diseases were controlled had an interest in 
sending campaigns to the North-East, because the risk of reinfection from its 
ports remained very real. However, outside the Centre-South numerous 
obstacles stood in the way of a strong public health movement: underfunded 
state governments, appointments of directors of sanitation without public 
health training or experience, the absence of laboratory facilities for 
systematic research, and, in Bahia, the power of the Escola Tropicalista 
Baiana, which enjoyed national prestige for pioneering the study of 'tropical' 
diseases in the mid-nineteenth century, but which tenaciously resisted the 
absorption of modern bacteriology. Furthermore, lack of cohesion among 
regional elites, the weakness of political party structures and, in 1928, 
violence in the middle Sao Francisco valley between the state government and 
rural power-holders, aborted effective political change. 
The limits to policy change were considerable. First, a knowledge of 
modern science and its application arrived haphazardly.88 Secondly, the 
professionalisation of the public health apparatus was a tortuous process, 
delayed by underfunding and political resistance. Thirdly, regulation without 
the means of enforcement - on garbage, dirty water and human excrement -
was an ever-present problem. On the coffee-producing slopes of the Centre-
South dirty clothes were customarily washed in streams that supplied drinking 
water further downhill. Finally, the compilation of reliable statistics upon 
which policy could be based was an arduous task. Mortality statistics were 
seriously flawed, because many deaths were not registered and their causes 
were often inaccurately diagnosed. Given the urban concentration of 
physicians,89 there was a problem of accurate diagnosis of death in rural 
areas. It seems probable that tuberculosis, for example, was under-reported 
because it was not diagnosed. Construction of statistics was, of course, 
hazardous among populations where pre-scientific concepts of disease 
causation - evil winds, evil eyes, witchcraft accusations and supernatural 
forces - prevailed. A drive towards greater precision in scientific diagnosis 
was not always accompanied by a drive (or a successful one) to precision in 
88 A knowledge of microbian theories arrived in Medellin long before 
microscopes. Carolina Reyes Cardenas, 'Higiene y salud en Medellin, 1900-
1930', Estudios Sociales (Medellin) no. 7, June 1994, pp. 13-43. 
89 In 1940 4.1 per cent of physicians in Mexico served the rural popula-
tion, which represented 58 per cent of the total population. 
the administrative apparatus responsible for health.90 
Public health reformers saw themselves as conducting several simultaneous 
battles: science versus ignorance; science versus erudition; science versus the 
advocacy of the minimalist state and low taxation; science versus the 
entrenched interests of the rural oligarchs and coroneis. By the First World 
War the city of Rio had accomplished significant changes. It possessed not 
only the veneer of sanitation that reassured international elites but something 
of the substance. However, this was achieved at a considerable cost in 
rehousing and relocating large parts of the poor population. In the current 
state of the subject, it cannot be determined whether the estrangement of 
sections of the urban poor posed insuperable obstacles to further public health 
initiative. By 1930 the rural position was improving too. Though more patchy 
than the urban, the rural achievement constituted a basis for action. In the 
coffee-producing areas the impact of the public health authorities had been 
relatively intense; but elsewhere they were felt more lightly and randomly. 
Reformers had now to confront new challenges thrown up by the World 
Depression and the Revolution of 1930. It seems likely that the very 
administrative centralisation which assisted reformers in achieving important 
goals in the 1920s hampered their projects in the 1930s as, under Getulio 
Vargas, the federal health bureaucracy lost much of its momentum and did 
little but undertake routine tasks.91 
'Tropical Medicine', the Diffusion of Scientific Knowledge 
and 'Traditional' Healing and Curing 
Changes in public health took place within the framework of transitions in 
'tropical medicine' and the diffusion and application of scientific knowledge. 
Following the advances in the biological sciences associated with Koch and 
Pasteur, 'tropical medicine' made considerable headway . New explanations 
of disease made possible new diagnostic tests and preceded the development 
of new vaccines. The institutionalisation of educational institutions in tropical 
medicine gave a further spur to research and to its diffusion through specialist 
periodicals and congresses. Latin American scientists were, to a large extent, 
90 A scarcity of specialist statisticians was one factor in the collapse of 
Colombian public health statistics during the World Depression. 
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the beneficiaries of a new distilled knowledge from the late 1880s, and made 
significant contributions to that corpus of knowledge from the 1900s. 
Gradually, as science gained prestige, resources were found to finance public 
health laboratories. However, the impetus to change was limited by 
punctuated growth and the pressures of other interests upon state budgets. 
Meanwhile, although the middle classes grew in size and income during the 
era of desarrollo hacia afuera and formed an expanding clientele for 
professional physicians and nurses, much of the rest of the population was 
excluded from the benefits of growth, remaining outside the market economy 
or enjoying incomes too small to generate a surplus that would pay for the 
services of professionals. Thus while both public health and private 
professional initiative gained a significant momentum, Luso-Hispanic, 
Amerindian and Afro-Latin American practices of medicine were strikingly 
tenacious, since they remained the only available and affordable option for 
large sections of the population . 
Conceptual problems arise with the term 'tropical' medicine - Saint 
Lazaire and Swansea experienced yellow fever in 1861;92 there were serious 
problems of malaria in Central Italy in the 1920s; and yellow fever sporadi-
cally afflicted parts of the temperate River Plate region until a final outbreak 
in 1857. Yet the term is helpful in being distinctive. It is probably the one 
area of scientific medicine where the disease was conceived in environmental 
terms from its inception. Germ theory was vital to the identification of the 
part played by the human carrier and the insect host in the transmission of 
diseases like yellow fever and typhoid.93 For most of the nineteenth century 
medical science favoured a noncontagionist view of the causation of yellow 
fever, transmission being effected not by person-to-person contact (con-
tagion), but by the movement of the miasma - a morbid influence - through 
the atmosphere. This orthodoxy was challenged by the view that yellow fever 
was a contagious disease of imported origin; and this, in turn, gave way to 
the Finlay-Reed demonstration of the role of the infected mosquito. The 
whole panoply of modern protective measures - preventive immunisation, 
coastal surveillance and sustained anti-mosquito measures - began to take 
shape, but was not complete without the discovery that the determinative 
agent of yellow fever was a virus. This accomplishment ushered in a decade 
in which procedures were devised for inducing efficient artificial immunity 
against the disease and serological tests were used for diagnostic purposes. 
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The study of 'tropical' medicine was progressively institutionalised in 
Europe and the United States: in London (in 1899), Liverpool (1899), 
Hamburg (1900), Brussels (1906), and in other colonial capitals - Rome, 
Madrid and Lisbon. In the United States a school was founded at Tulane 
University, New Orleans; and in 1924 a School of Tropical Medicine 
affiliated to Columbia University was founded in Puerto Rico. In the last 
decades of the nineteenth century no specialist journals existed that were 
devoted to 'tropical' medicine. In the United Kingdom scientific knowledge 
was diffused through service journals and in the United States bulletins of the 
US Department of Agriculture. Only belatedly was the publication of articles 
on 'tropical medicine' in French and German vanguard journals emulated by 
their counterparts in the Britain and the United States, with the British 
Medical Journal acquiring some significance in this area in the 1890s and the 
Lancet less. There followed a spate of new journals, with even the foundation 
of the Philippine Journal of Science in 1906, which was to become the 
Philippine Journal of Tropical Medicine. In the United States specialist 
journals got off to a more hesitant start than in Britain; and they had a less 
continuous existence, probably, because Britain, with a vast empire, had 
more subscribers. In 1914 the active membership of the Royal Society of 
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene was about 600; that of its counterpart in the 
United States 15.94 
In Latin America too the beginnings of modern scientific and medical 
publication can be detected. Positivist periodicals devoted to the 
popularisation of the sciences, like the Mexican El mundo cientifico, 
published from 1877, pressed for political action and deplored official 
indifference to typhus epidemic in the City of Mexico.95 Gradually each of 
the larger and intermediate Latin American countries acquired a national (and 
in places a regional) medical journal usually associated with the medicine 
faculties. Colombian medical journals published in Bogota and Medellin in 
the early decades of the twentieth century carried articles on local public 
health issues - epidemics, improvements of the water supply, and such 
themes as the sanitation of boats on the River Magdalena - together with 
translations and summaries of articles in English (including some from Indian 
and Australian journals), French, Italian and German, plus contributions 
94 Eli Chernin, 'The early British and American journals of tropical 
medicine and hygiene: an informal survey', Medical History, vol. 31, no. 1, 
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from other Spanish-speaking countries.96 The specialist journals, together 
with international meetings and specialised congresses, propagated pro-
fessional standards, accelerated the exchange of information, and promoted 
a growth of awareness of such themes as the transmission of disease by 
insects (filariasis, human malaria, Texan fever), the life-cycles of micro-
organisms and parasites, the biology of vectors and the epidemiology of 
disease. The international context was ripe for the export of bacteriology and 
stressed the value of rigorous laboratory examination. 
As has been noted above, Brazilian claims to have isolated the germ of 
yellow fever were rejected in Europe, because they failed to meet high 
standards of bacteriological enquiry, with a particular emphasis on laboratory 
study and the isolation of the microbe. Similarly, the Cuban researcher 
Carlos Finlay failed to reach a wide audience, probably because he worked 
alone, in a country lacking a recognised scientific tradition, and published his 
epidemiological findings when tropical medicine was identified with 
bacteriological study and was judged by the quality of laboratory investiga-
tion. A gifted sanitarian and epidemiologist, Finlay was unable between 1882 
and 1900 to corroborate his claims in the laboratories, and could not prove 
convincingly the etiological link between the bacillus and yellow fever.97 
Only with the mission of Walter Reed during the First US Occupation were 
empirical investigation and verification possible and the role of the stegomy ia 
mosquito irrefutably established.9? Successful research was translated into 
policy, and with draconian action yellow fever disappeared from Cuba 
between 1902 and 1904, only to re-enter from New Orleans in 1905, and 
again to be brought under control by 1909. Thereafter no further deaths from 
the disease were registered in the island.99 The forecast of Finlay that a 
large wave of European immigration would accompany an improved sanitary 
record was vindicated. The Cuban research findings were rapidly made 
available elsewhere. Observation of Cuban experience proved invaluable to 
96 The content of these Colombian journals will be the subject of a future 
publication by the author. 
97 Lowy, 'Yellow Fever in Rio... ' , pp. 144-63. 
98 A. McGehee Harvey, 'Johns Hopkins and Yellow fever: A Study of 
Tragedy and Triumph', in A. McGehee Harvey (ed.), Research and 
Discovery in Medicine (Baltimore, 1976), pp. 34-48. 
99 Emilio Roig de Leuschenring, Medicos y medicina en Cuba. Historia, 
biografia, costumbrismo (Havana, 1965), pp. 116-7, 131; Juan Perez de la 
Riva, El barracony otros ensayos (Havana, 1979), pp. 514-5; Rafael Maria 
de Labra y Martinez, Cuba comopais de inmigracion (Madrid, 1910), p. 26. 
puzzled Brazilians, who wanted to know why sanitary measures taken against 
yellow fever in Campinas were more successful than elsewhere in the state 
of Sao Paulo. The answer was that in Campinas they included drainage of 
mosquito-breeding places. 
The beginnings of modern public health laboratories complemented 
scientific breakthroughs. The Brazilian President Francisco Rodriguez Alves 
appointed Osvaldo Cruz, who had studied microbiology at the Institut Pasteur 
in Paris, as technological director of the Instituto Sorotherapico (serum 
therapy) de Magnuinhos producing plague serums and vaccines.100 The 
scientific success of Cruz and the Institute was confirmed by international 
awards and the discovery of a 'new' tropical disease induced by trypanosoma 
- Chagas' disease - identified by a student of Cruz, Carlos Chagas, in 1909. 
These changes, which embodied a qualitative transformation in Brazilian 
bacteriology, took place during the transition from the heavily bacteriological 
approach in public health which prevailed till the 1910s to a more eclectic 
approach combining environmental and ecological with bacteriological 
factors. (This was reflected in a change of slogan from 'isolate the microbe' 
to 'eradicate the vector'.) Brazilian success in reducing yellow fever (984 
reported cases in 1902, 42 in 1906, 0 in 1909) and bubonic plague weakened 
public and professional opposition to bacteriological theories and enhanced 
national self-esteem, and assured the funding, and, therefore, the survival of 
the renamed Cruz Institute. 
Meanwhile, Puerto Rico, which had the peculiar status of an 'unincorpor-
ated territory' of the United States, set certain trends for northern Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Owing to the Hurricane of San Ciriaco, a crisis 
of homelessness, starvation and irretrievable damage to coffee farms 
accompanied the transition of sovereignty in Puerto Rico from Spain to the 
United States between 1899 and 1901. The US occupation authorities were 
alerted to health issues. Anxious both to maintain the supply of drinking-
water in San Juan and to avert epidemic, the US authorities used a carefully 
mounted relief programme as a means of displaying their efficient benevol-
ence.101 Public health expenditure in the island quintupled between 1910 
and 1930. By 1930 the island public health administration possessed 
biological laboratories, a chemical laboratory for food inspection and an x-
ray laboratory. Separate bureaux dealt with prevention of bubonic plague, 
malaria control, social medicine, rural sanitation, sanitary engineering, 
100 Nancy Stepan, The Beginnings of Brazilian Science (New York, 1976). 
101 Stuart R. Schwartz, 'The Hurricane of San Ciriaco: Disaster, Politics 
and Society in Puerto Rico, 1899-1901', Hispanic American Historical 
Review, vol. 72, no. 3, Aug. 1992, pp. 303-34. 
health education and vital statistics. Teachers' training institutes stressed 
health education, especially hookworm prevention. And the first pre-natal 
and baby clinics, anti-tuberculosis and anti-syphilis clinics were established. 
However, even Puerto Rico suffered shortages of essential personnel outside 
the cities of San Juan and Ponce, so that water chlorination plants fell into 
disuse for lack of engineers to repair them.102 In the 1930s Colombian and 
Venezuelan public health officials and postgraduate students were sent to the 
island to study public health institutions and trends. 
The limits to the influence of Western 'scientific' medicine should not be 
understated. In the 1950s large populations still resorted to healers in 
Amerindian, Luso-Hispanic and Afro-Latin American traditions; yet for the 
decades examined here a literature on Amerindian traditions is very 
restricted; that on Luso-Hispanic themes barely exists; and that on Afro-Latin 
American topics is too slender to synthesise.103 The evidence upon Mexican 
Amerindians and mestizos indicates intermittent local resistance to centralised 
public health policies between the 1920s and 1940s. Rural populations 
supported protests organised by curanderos and brujos against physicians 
who posed challenges to their incomes and authority and to established 
patterns of health delivery. Indeed, during the 1930s, peasant opposition to 
compulsory smallpox vaccination culminated in attacks against itinerant 
nurses as they arrived on horseback at villages. Mexican Amerindians 
hesitated before attending health units for preventive measures, for three 
reasons: because they associated healing with illness, a shameful event; 
because visiting a physician was time-consuming and costly, involving delays 
and appointments only during the workday; and because health care 
professionals, unlike neighbourhood curanderos, belonged to a distinct and 
alien social class. The Mexican rural poor and Rockefeller scientists differed 
in their perceptions of hookworm: the one seeing it as an unavoidable fate 
like hunger, the other conceiving it as a disease, and, therefore, conscien-
tiously setting out to 'create the disease in the minds of the people', through 
illuminated house-to-house talks on the life-cycle of the hookworm, which, 
Foundation officials hoped, would inculcate germ theory in the minds of 
peasants.104 
102 Clark et al., Porto Rico..., pp. 55-71. 
103 Medical practitioners were seldom interested before the 1960s in the 
content and internal logic of 'folk' medicine and its connections with 
religion. It was often left to social anthropologists and public health 
specialists to pioneer studies of these areas. 
104 Birn, 'Local Health and Foreign Wealth', esp. pp. 118, 209-10, 214. 
In the absence of sustained study of Afro-Latin American traditions, it can 
be assumed provisionally that the conditions of the remaining slaves of the 
1870s and of former slaves in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, did 
not differ significantly from that in earlier decades, except where public 
health policies had an impact across all socio-ethnic categories. Afro-Latin 
American and Afro-Caribbean populations were vulnerable to a wide range 
of epidemic and endemic diseases. Dysentery had preyed on the Atlantic 
slave ships and markets in Cartagena, Salvador, Rio, Havana and elsewhere. 
Among Afro-Caribbean slaves beriberi was commonplace as a consequence 
of thiamine deficiency and pellagra because of niacin deficiency, with 
infantile beriberi, frequently a fatal disease, being received by babies from 
their mothers, the victims of an impaired reproductive ability, through their 
milk. Marasmus, which causes a child to waste away, and turiashiakor, a 
disease caused by protein-energy malnutrition, hit children once their 
mothers stopped nursing them. Slaves were especially vulnerable to waves 
of cholera that hit Cuba and Puerto Rico in the 1850s, returning to Cuba in 
1867.105 European physicians, quite numerous in the Caribbean where they 
treated sailors and soldiers during the revolutionary and colonial wars, 
seldom treated slaves. Indeed, European physicians were especially repulsed 
by the ulcerous eruptions associated with yaws, which, endemic along the 
West African littoral, grew to epidemic proportions on slave vessels and was 
commonplace among slave populations. Yaws was treated almost exclusively 
by black attendants because African medicine was more efficacious than 
European, and because white doctors, afraid of contagion, were unable or 
unwilling to look into the character and efficacy of black folk remedies.106 
The congestion, dietary imbalance and multiple disease environment on slave 
ships in the Middle Passage composed a lethal cocktail which the genesis of 
modern nautical medicine could do little to ameliorate.107 Some success was 
105 K.F. Kiple, 'Cholera and race in the Caribbean', Journal of Latin 
American Studies, vol. 17, 1983, pp. 157-77; David L. Chandler, 'Health 
and Slavery: a study of health conditions among slaves in the viceroyalty of 
New Granada and its associated slave trade, 1600-1800' (unpub. PhD thesis, 
Tulane University, 1980). 
106 Richard B. Sheridan, Doctors and Slaves. A medical and demographic 
history of slavery in the British West Indies, 1680-1834 (Cambridge, 1985), 
pp. 76. 83. 
107 Disease in the Middle Passage included dysentery, diarrhoea, 
elephantiasis, hookworm, leprosy, malaria, ophthalmia, scurvy, smallpox, 
syphilis, tapeworm, typhoid fever, trypanosomiasis, yaws and yellow fever. 
Ulcers, wounds and sores arose from accidents and whipping. Malnutrition 
was commonplace. Sheridan, Doctors and Slaves..., p. 116. 
registered with the use of citrus fruits and other antiscorbutics for scurvy and 
inoculation for smallpox. 
The position on land was little better than at sea. The heavy, enervating 
work demanded by sugar-cane (compared to coffee, cotton or tobacco) took 
its toll on the plantations. While in Jamaica planters allocated some land as 
provision grounds to amplify food supplies to slaves, and perhaps to improve 
their diet, the pressure to maximise profits from sugar-cane in Cuba and 
other islands reduced the acreage available for food staples, compelling 
slaves increasingly to rely on supplies of imported foodstuffs (jerked beef 
from the province of Buenos Aires to Cuba, salted codfish from the Eastern 
Seaboard of the United States elsewhere) that were disrupted by warfare and 
shortages of shipping. High levels of slave mortality were linked with food 
and water supplies contaminated by human, animal and vegetable waste, as 
well as by lack of hygiene, a poor diet, excessive workloads, accidents, 
suicides and brutal punishments. This was a fatal disease environment, in 
which planters and physicians often misinterpreted poor health and nutrition 
as evidence of laziness, and punished slaves who failed to perform their work 
quotas by food deprivation, thus causing further sickness. Even an 
enlightened physician could neither alleviate working and living conditions 
nor keep slaves in hospital for treatment when managers claimed they were 
feigning illness; and the enslaved patient was hesitant to entrust his life to a 
stranger.108 
The condition of urban slaves was little better. In the city of Rio de 
Janeiro, tuberculosis, especially pulmonary tuberculosis, was endemic among 
the poor. Both slaves, especially new arrivals being 'seasoned', and the free 
blacks, as well as European immigrants, were victim to tuberculosis, which 
spread especially among female domestic workers in dark, overcrowded 
homes. Dysentery was second to tuberculosis among infectious-parasitic 
diseases as a cause of slave mortality. Vaccination programmes were too 
incomplete to prevent the arrival of smallpox in eight major epidemics 
between 1825 and 1850, hitting especially new arrivals from Africa, slaves 
re-sold in Rio from Pernambuco in the north-east and Amerindians brought 
to work in the city. Tetanus was the fourth cause of slave mortality (however, 
more than one disease was diagnosed as tetanus.) Contemporary description 
spoke of an epidemic of pernicious fevers desolating Macacu in the province 
of Rio before reaching the city in 1829-30. And malaria seems to have been 
endemic. Of the ethnic groups resident in Rio, Africans had the lowest rates 
of yellow fever, a disease which terrorised the city at intervals. The death 
rate among slaves began to fall only after the abolition of the international 
108 Sheridan, Doctors and Slaves..., esp. pp. 28-30,73,78, 83,99,116-8, 
155, 164, 187-9, 335, 342. 
slave trade in 1850. Each neighbourhood of Rio had an African surgeon 
working usually in the open air, dispensing free advice, selling medicines, 
with amulets to drive out evil spirits.109 
By the First World War the conditions existed for the rapid diffusion of 
information regarding new scientific research and its practical application to 
physicians in most countries of the continent. By the 1920s national elites in 
the larger and intermediate countries had established or were debating the 
creation of public health laboratories. The view that preventive action against 
various diseases was less costly than curative, was now an orthodoxy among 
informed opinion. Just as compulsory primary schooling figured on the 
statute book in most countries of the continent by 1930, but could not be 
enforced, so enlightened regulation in health issues was adopted, but was 
implemented only patchily. Similarly, while new scientific knowledge 
percolated to professionals in major urban centres, the radius of its impact 
was circumscribed, because most urban workers and peasants were deterred 
from employing the services of professional physicians and nurses by their 
paucity, their fees, social distance, and, for rural populations, their urban 
residence. 
Some Notes on Health, Nutrition and Housing 
Problems of health cannot be considered without some reference to related 
problems of nutrition, housing and poor public services.110 The deficient 
109 Other common diseases were typhus (often confused with typhoid 
fever), whooping cough (pertusis), measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, 
mumps, chicken pox, poliomyelitis, influenza, ophthalmia, filariasis, 
leprosy, jaws, syphilis, sarma (perhaps scabies), elephantiasis, beriberi, 
diarrhoea, intestinal parasites and other gastrointestinal disorders, pneu-
monia, pulmonary tuberculosis and other respiratory conditions, and diseases 
of the nervous system, the manifestations of sleeping sickness, encephalitis, 
meningitis, epilepsy and nutritional diseases. Mary C. Karasch, Slave Life in 
Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1850 (Princeton, 1987), pp. 19, 87, 146-84, 264. The 
ratio of life expectancy of the Brazilian male slaves was 0.68 to that for the 
total male population in 1872. Thomas W. Merrick and Douglas H. Graham, 
Population and Economic Development in Brazil 1800 to the present 
(Baltimore, 1979), p. 57. 
110 In parts of the city of Buenos Aires privies filtered human waste back 
into the water table, which lay close to the surface of the soil. Only the 
building of railways and tramways which raised urban land values gave a 
spur to the improvement of the basic services, like installing water and sewer 
evidence available suggests that nutritional patterns were very unequal, and 
not uniformally bad. A colonial tradition of food regulation to maintain social 
harmony in the cities outlived the upheavals of independence in some cities. 
Patterns of inspection of public markets and granaries survived, together with 
inspection for accuracy of weights and measures. And juntas de beneficencia 
(charity boards) supplemented the Catholic Church as donors of food 
charity.111 Some random examples over time and space indicate the main 
problems of nutrition. 
Peru illustrated the possibilities of a well-developed trade in a wide range 
of comestibles from different altitudes. Food scarcities were never critical in 
Lima until the crisis caused by the War of the Pacific (1879-83). Seafood 
(especially ceviche - lime-marinated fish salad) was widely consumed; and 
wheat was imported from the Central Valley of Chile. Warfare, however, 
prompted shortages; and emergency measures to control prices and protect 
merchants were insufficient to prevent looting. Food prices did not fall to 
pre-war levels after the war, because growing numbers of miners and 
plantation workers without subsistence plots exerted new pressures upon food 
supplies. Vegetables virtually disappeared from the market stalls of Lima 
from 1892, and food prices doubled over the next seven years.112 The 
Argentine city of Salta around the year 1900 showed a more positive picture. 
Artisans and shopkeepers, as well as the upper class, had a balanced diet of 
roast meat, empanadas, fruit, vegetables and corn.113 Nor was the picture 
in pre-revolutionary Cuba entirely gloomy. The World Bank report for Cuba 
of 1950-1 stressed that the diet on the island in the 1940s - years of good 
sugar-cane prices - had been reasonably balanced, if unvaried, and that in the 
1950s it could be improved at little additional cost, if experiments in the 
Philippines with artificially enriched rice were followed. (The polished rice 
consumed generally in Cuba lost some 50 per cent of its mineral and vitamin 
pipes, paving streets with cobblestone or granite, and organising rubbish 
collection. James R. Scobie, Buenos Aires, Plaza to Suburb (New York, 
1974), pp. 21-32. 
111 John C. Super, 'The Formation of Nutritional Regimes in colonial 
Latin America', John C. in Super and Thomas C. Wright, Food, Politics and 
Society in Latin America (Lincoln, Neb., 1985), pp. 1-23. 
112 Vincent C. Peloso, 'Succulence and sustenance: region, class and diet 
in nineteenth century Peru' in Super and Wright (eds.), Food, Politics and 
Society..., pp. 46-64. 
113 James R. Scobie, Secondary Cities of Argentina, p. 89. 
content.)114 However, Argentina and Cuba were among the most prosperous 
countries of Latin America. In the poorest parts of Latin America, like 
Guatemala, the picture was more gloomy. Among sample families in 
Magdalena Milpas Altas, the greatest single item of expenditure was cereals: 
the percentage of income spent on beans - a cheap staple - rose as income 
declined; and meat, fruit and dairy products were luxury items.115 
The public health authorities spread the beginnings of a modern nutrition 
consciousness. The first nutritional studies were conducted in the cities. By 
1914 there was some awareness in Rio that nutritional deficiencies were 
exacerbated by parasitical infections, bacterial infections like cholera and 
diphtheria and viral (protozoal) diseases like smallpox and malaria. Babies, 
which represented about two-thirds of recorded deaths from gastrointestinal 
diseases, often received a lamentably inappropriate diet. Some were fed with 
watered wine, soup of pasta, beans, bananas and dried beef, but not milk. An 
official calculation in 1914, beginning from an 'average family' of seven 
(with two servants - sic) estimated that daily food spending cost triple the 
monthly earnings of a textile worker. This idealised 'average family' was 
assumed to consume fresh meat, fish, maize, potatoes and dairy products. 
By the early 1940s there was a clear awareness in Mexico that underper-
formance by labour (and also the problem of wounds healing slowly) was 
rooted in malnutrition. Early studies of rural sociology in Mexico are 
especially interesting. Nathan Whetten's classic synthesis of his own research 
and that of Mexican and US sociologists of the 1940s argued that it was 
possible to nourish Mexicans adequately on the Mesa Central without 
following US dietary models, that is, without stressing dairy and meat 
products. This was because pulque, the drink produced by fermentation of the 
maguey plant, contained protein and vitamin B, while sesame, cabaleza and 
guaje seeds and charales, parote and peanuts were rich in calcium, protein, 
iron, niacin and thiamine. Eating tortillas and plants and drinking pulque did 
not lead to pronounced clinical nutritional deficiencies, except for ribofla-
vin.116 Whetten also hinted at the way in which the solution of one public 
114 Report on Cuba. Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and 
Technological Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development... 1950 (Baltimore, 1951), p. 251. 
115 Nathan Whetten, Guatemala. The Land and the People (New Haven, 
1961), p. 207. 
116 In Guatemala, Amerindians in the 1950s relied heavily on maize, eating 
0.75 lb. maize per day per person. Laboratory tests indicated a serious loss 
of nutrients - thiamins and riboflavin - in the process of converting maize 
health problem could lead to a dietary deficiency. Knowledge among the 
urban middle class of Mexico City of the dangers posed by drinking dirty 
water led to the fashion of consuming bottled soft drinks, which was perhaps 
desirable from the perspectives of urban employment and industrialisation, 
but which deferred the development of a nutritionally desirable packed fruit 
juice industry that would create farming jobs.117 
Poor health conditions were inextricably linked with defective housing, 
especially problems of overcrowding, ventilation and poor cooking facilities. 
The problem of inadequate urban housing was exemplified by the conventillos 
(high-density, low-income housing, including tenement dwellings) that were 
sensationalised by the press and novels of turn-of the-century Buenos Aires. 
Little attention was given to residential areas of the urban poor, like the 
Barrio las Ranas where several thousand people existed in shacks of wooden 
boards and galvanised sheets, and livelihoods were earned from scavenging 
in the city garbage dump. But the conventillos were the objects of some 
official attention in the last decades of the nineteenth century as loci of 
infectious diseases and natural habitats for smallpox. One main policy 
problem was that a disease had to be declared to be present before a 
sanitation policy could be applied. Thus little preventive action was taken; 
and sanitary services proved to be slow, delayed and unnecessarily expens-
ive. The conditions were taking shape for the Great Tenants' Strike of 
1907.118 
The position was worse in rural housing. Inadequacies were exemplified 
by Mexico and Guatemala. In Mexico 44.9 per cent of all rural housing was 
classified as huts in 1939. On the Mesa Central primitive shelters had 
structures consisting entirely of cactus stalks and leaves in areas of plentiful 
cacti; but where cacti did not exist homes were often made of piles of loose 
stones covered with thatched roofs of straw, sticks and leaves. Pneumonia 
into tortillas. Whetten, Guatemala..., p. 199. 
117 Nathan Whetten (with foreword by Manuel Gamio), Rural Mexico 
(Chicago, 1948), pp. 310-4. 
118 Scobie, Buenos Aires. Plaza to Suburb, p. 19; Leandro H. Gutierrez 
and Juan Seriano, 'Workers' Housing and Living Conditions in Buenos 
Aires, 1880-1930', in Adelman (ed.), Essays in Argentine Labour History, 
pp. 35-51. Perhaps conditions were inferior in smaller cities and towns. In 
Cordoba planks, straw and corrugated zinc formed the basic structure of 
modest homes during the Liberal era. Mark D. Szuchman, Mobility and 
Integration in Urban Argentina. Cordoba in the Liberal Era (Austin, Tx., 
1980), p. 59. 
was commonplace, because of freezing weather, lack of bedding (straw 
thrown on the floor) and lack of adequate clothing, especially among women. 
(Men often had serapes - woollen blankets). Meanwhile, in the floodlands of 
Oaxaca, Chiapas and Campeche, the failure to use mosquito netting in the 
1940s and the lack of screens on houses exposed local populations to malaria-
carrying mosquitoes.119 In Guatemala too, poor housing conditions aggra-
vated bronchitis and pneumonia, which together constituted the second most 
common cause of death. Building materials were inadequate to keep out the 
cold; and smoke from cooking fires irritated the respiratory passages of 
peasants and rural labourers.120 
Apparent improvements in housing could be counter-productive. In the city 
and province of Buenos Aires a shift in the late nineteenth century from sun-
dried adobes and straw thatch to kiln-based bricks and tiles made higher 
ceilings possible. These meant more ventilation, but also more draughts.121 
In Puerto Rico there was concern in the early twentieth century that a 
transition from traditions of thatch roofs and bark wall huts to new cabins of 
boards and corrugated iron encouraged tuberculosis.122 
Conclusions 
By 1950 there was cause for both cautious optimism and considerable 
concern. Latin America had some positive experience of adapting foreign 
organisational models to local needs and of putting imported technology to 
local requirements. On the other hand, no country or group of countries had 
evolved an autonomous base in scientific research and development. In some 
respects policy in the continent was skewed to external requirements. And, 
as agencies like PAHO and UNICEF expanded their presence, there was a 
risk that this discrepancy would grow. Disputes over resources were often 
resolved in favour of maintaining or expanding provision at existing 
institutions, such as specialist hospitals, rather than developing the many 
neglected areas of primary health care which demanded ever more urgent 
consideration at the onset of the 'demographic explosion'. Life expectancy 
continued to rise; and levels of infant mortality to fall. But, while a bias for 
hope might be registered for the continent as a whole, cause for considerable 
119 Whetten, Rural Mexico, esp. pp. 286-7, 335-6. 
120 Whetten, Guatemala..., p. 219. 
121 Scobie, Buenos Aires..., p. 127. 
122 Clark, Porto Rico..., pp. 45-51. 
gloom was justified for those who were excluded from the benefits of change 
for reason of location, social class, gender, ethnic or age group and 
pronounced income maldistribution. 
These are themes that, for the most part, historians are only beginning to 
examine. The current state of research is very uneven, and the subject has 
usually been addressed only tangentially by historians. Some future 
developments are suggested by the colonial historiography, which has 
considerable strengths, especially in the study of Afro-Latin American and 
Amerindian traditions of healing and curing, and the evolution of syncretisms 
between them, 'official' medicine and folk Luso-Hispanic traditions. 
Meanwhile, the work of Marcos Cueto and his associates on the health and 
agriculture missions of the Rockefeller Foundation suggests several fruitful 
lines of enquiry, for example, into the role of foreigners in diffusing 
incremental changes, stressing the importance of cost-effectiveness in policy, 
and emphasising a scrupulous thoroughness in both scientific experiment and 
laboratory investigation of outbreaks of disease. Considerable scope remains 
for the study, using French archives, of the diffusion of French models.123 
Not all innovation, however, radiated from the United States and France. 
There were major sub-centres of research within the continent. The work of 
Bernardo Houssay and his group of physiologists in Peronist Argentina, the 
evolution and significance of the National Institute of Cardiology in Mexico 
City and the development of 'yellow fever studies' in Brazil and Colombia 
deserve more attention. Furthermore, there were major sub-centres of policy 
innovation too. The experiences of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal 
Zone have been referred to here. But the significance of experiments in 
patient care and hospital development - both general and specialist - in the 
Southern Cone, and of the health dimension in social security policies, 
especially in Uruguay, merit further attention. 
Recent historiography of Latin America suggests various lines of 
investigation. Developments in historical demography and social history 
indicate ways in which patterns of mortality and morbidity - adult and child 
- could be fruitfully explored, in conjunction with investigations into the 
incidence of disease over time, by socio-ethnic category and social class. The 
explosion of peasant studies since the 1960s raises various questions. How 
far were hygiene and sanitation priorities of agrarian radicals? How 
123 The fascinating discussion of Thomas F. Glick of the impact of Spanish 
Republican refugees on Mexican institutions in pharmacology, physiology 
and neurosurgery is weakened by the lack of an analysis of the cumulative 
impact of both French influences and the revolutionary intelligentsia in 
shaping an intellectual environment that was recipient to scientific research. 
Glick, 'Science and society in twentieth century Latin America...'. 
significant were permanent demands for public health services? To what 
extent were they linked with pressures for better veterinary practice? How far 
was better public health provision interpreted as an imposition from above, 
and regarded suspiciously by peasants and rural labourers as an instrument 
of control by capital-city elites? The growth of studies of urban labour gives 
rise to another set of useful questions. How far were health improvements 
among urban workers the consequences of trade union struggles? Did early 
measures of 'worker hygiene', which prefigured later moves towards 
occupational health, represent conquests of labour militancy or instruments 
of co-option and control by governments in conjunction with professional 
leaders and progressive elements of business? The more modestly expanding 
business historiography has tended both to neglect the significance of health 
care as a device for protecting foreign managers and for controlling Latin 
American labour, and to overlook the role of merchant elites in influencing 
urban health policy, especially with regard to epidemics. Both the literature 
on the history of the Catholic Church and that on the history of women have 
usually understated the significance of female religious orders, especially in 
nursing - a theme that deserves subtle exploration. Recent writing on genetics 
hints at ways in which modern paediatrics grew out of 'puericulture' - a rich 
theme in the history of childhood. And the literature on the history of the 
state, increasingly strong on the evolution of economic policy mechanisms, 
remains lamentably weak on that of social policy institutions. A wealth of 
official documents emanating from city, national and international agencies, 
of reports by the officials of philanthropic organisations, and of medical 
journals awaits the prospective researcher. 
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